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Faculty and Deans

UNINTELLIGENT DESIGN IN
CONTRACT
Peter A. Alces*
Scholars have expended considerable energy in the effort to
"discover" a normative theory of Contract. This Article surveys that
effort and concludes that something fundamental about Contract has
been missed and has frustrated the search from the outset. Succinctly,
Contract doctrine resists the neat formulation theory requires.
Theorists' perspectives on Contract may be generalized as attempts to impute either deontology or consequentialism to the Contract law. Focusing largely on deontological constructions of Contract, this Article demonstrates the inconsistencies among the extant
heuristics-promise, reliance, and transfer-and more importantly,
the failure of any of those constructions to provide a coherent explanation of Contract doctrine. This failure reveals a more fundamental
failure of Contract theory generally: Because doctrine is a matter of
historical accident rather than "divine" inspiration, efforts to explain
doctrine as an outgrowth of some coherent and fundamental purpose
are necessarily unavailing, and ultimately obfuscatory.
Contract defies reduction into certain normative terms because
Contract doctrine is an amalgam of normative inclinations. Neither
pure deontology nor pure consequentialism is the source of all Contract; both rather serve as poles at the ends of a Contract continuum.
This Article concludes that the search for the grail- the theory of
Contract-heretofore has been misdirected. Our effort to understand
Contract in normative terms should begin anew, from the premises
offered here.
When the qualifications needed to make a supposedly simple basic
structure of theory give accurate results in practice reach the point
where the simplicity is overwhelmed by its own qualifications, and
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when the qualifications are not made to cohere in theory, though
they do in meaning, then a fresh start becomes over-due.'
-Karl N. Llewellyn
INTRODUCTION

There is in legal theory an apparent urge to understand one thing,
Law, in terms of another, say, Morality. We are preoccupied with discovering or positing the moral foundation of law, or an area of law. That
is, perhaps, particularly evident in Contract law, where theorists have expended considerable effort to formulate the legally enforceable promise
and its incidents in terms of the three dominant modes of normative
thought: consequentialism (primarily microeconomic theory), 2 deontology (rights based theory),3 and Aristotelian, or aretaic, theory (virtue
ethics). 4 There seems to be the sense that we gain something by discovering such an equation, that we better understand Contract and can also
better appraise its successes and failures if we are able to formulate Contract in normative terms. Perhaps that is a pervasive human tendency,
the same tendency that is illustrated by and explains the naturalistic fallacy.5
But it might be worthwhile to pause and reflect on whether we are
warranted in expecting Contract to resolve in normative terms. After all,
we acknowledge that Contract is about legally enforceable promises, and
not all promises are legally enforceable.6 So while it may be moral to
1. K.N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contact: Offer and Acceptance, 48 YALE L.J. 1, 1
{1938).
2. Peter A. Alces, On Discovering Doctrine: "Justice" in Contract Agreement, 83 WASH. U. L.Q.
471, 502-03 (2005) (hereinafter Alces. On Discovering Doctrine].
3. Peter A. Alces, The Moral Impossibility of Contract, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1647, 1656-57
(2007).
4. See generally JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACf
DOCfRINE (1991).
5. This may be akin to the error of confusing the "is" with the "ought," which Hume identified:
For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ' tis necessary that it
shou'd be obsrv'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason shou'd be given, for what
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are
entirely different from it.
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 302 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton eds.,
2000). G .E . Moore extended Hume's point by positing the "naturalistic fallacy," the identification of
"goodness" with a natural property. G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 60 (Thomas Baldwin ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1993) (1903). The point I make here is analogous a nd much more modest: we
should no more assume that Contract or, for that matter, any body of legal doctrine is normatively
coherent than we should assume that what "is" is what "ought" to be (by whatever measure we use to
determine what ought to be).
6. Professor Peter Benson correctly demonstrates the error in Lon Fuller and William Perdue's
equation of all promises, juridical and, for lack of a better term, casual. See Peter Benson, The Expectation and Reliance Interests in Contract Theory: A Reply to Fuller and Perdue, ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, June 2001 , at 29-51, (2001), http://www.bepress.com/ils/issl/art5/. The law need not
explain why some promises are enforceable and others are not; but the law does need to offer a normative basis for the enforceability of juridical promises. Benson, as will be developed further below,
finds the basis of juridical promise enforcement in his "transfer theory" of contract. /d. at 31.
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keep your promises, the law does not constrain you to do so. Indeed,
Contract law is largely about that disjunction between the promise and
the legally enforceable promise. Nonetheless, it remains worthwhile to
consider the posited normative foundations of Contract, even if for no
other reason than to deny that they exist. The focus here will be on deontological Contract theory, though the consequentialist and aretaic responses could not be ignored entirely.
The deontologists' efforts have proceeded in tandem with, or after
recitation of, a governing descriptive heuristic. Contract is first conceived as either a matter of promise,7 or of reliance,8 or of transfer, 9 the
implication being that identification of the appropriate heuristic accommodates development of the appropriate normative characterization.
Initially you could understand the value of such heuristics as providing a
test of Contract doctrine. For example, if Contract is coextensive with
promise, then whenever your moral theory would tell you to honor a
promise the contract must be enforced. To the same extent, if Contract
is based on reliance, then enforce contracts to the extent that your failure
to do so would frustrate reliance but do not enforce a contract if there
has been no sufficient reliance thereon. Finally, if Contract effects a
transfer, much as does the conveyance of property, treat the contract as
enforceable as though the promisor has transferred a res to the promisee;
that is, recognize that the promisee actually acquires something more
than a mere expectancy when the contract forms.
Further, and this is the focus of the inquiry here, if only we knew
what happens when Contract-talk pertains, then we would know how to
explain Contract in normative terms. Consider, if Contract is a matter of
promise, then perhaps Kantian deontology provides the key;10 if Contract
is based on reliance, then maybe aretaic theory explains; 11 and if Contract
is a matter of transfer, it may be that the Hegelian justification of Contract12 offers the most coherent and comprehensive explanation of extant
doctrine. In response to each deontological perspective, the consequentialist, predominantly the welfare economist, is dubious. 13 What is the
point, he asks, of discovering a "one size fits all" normative theory that
we must, at least occasionally, contort to fit the result dictated by the

7. Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the "Restitution Interest," and the Restatement of
Contracts , 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021, 2033-34 (2001).
8.

/d.
/d.
10. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981).
11. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 71 (1974) (citing commentary to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1965)). See generally P.S.
ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981); LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
12. See, e.g., Randy E . Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986);
Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 118, 128
(Peter Benson ed., 2001 ).
13. See generally Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989).

9.
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doctrine? 14 And to that skepticism the deontologist may rejoin that neither positive nor normative economic theory has provided the answers. 15
So, first, we must sort out the relations among the heuristics (promise,
reliance, or transfer) and the theory they would support. That will be the
object of Part I, largely an expository survey.
The shortcomings of the promise and reliance heuristics have been
convincingly treated at length elsewhere, 16 and those deficiencies will not
be recounted here except to clarify the distinctive contribution of transfer conceptions. However, the transfer heuristic is importantly different.
Conceptions of Contract as transfer very essentially discover a normative
basis of Contract in the normative conceptions of the property law. So
the challenge for those who would discover the normative foundation of
Contract in transfer is twofold: The transfer paradigm must fit extant
Contract doctrine and must point in the same direction as the normative
incidents of property law. If Contract accomplishes a transfer, much as
does a conveyance of real or personal property, should not the morality
of Contract mirror (or at least not contradict) the morality of property
law? So conceived there is a great deal at stake in exploring the normative coincidence of Contract and property: If they diverge, there may be
good normative reason for their doing so. But if we can discover no
good normative reason for that divergence, are Contract or property or
both normatively incoherent insofar as the terms of their doctrine are
concerned? The inquiry is important because the answer may be so disconcerting.
Further, a focus on the transfer heuristic will provide a vehicle to
demonstrate the limitations of normative theory in Contract generally.
This, in turn, reveals what may be a more fundamental failure of the law:
Doctrine is a matter of historical accident, not quasi-divine inspiration,
and efforts to understand legal doctrine in terms of some coherent and
fundamental purpose or object are doomed to fail. To an extent, then,
this paper takes up a challenge confronting Contract in terms that may
inform our conception of doctrinal coherence even beyond Contract

14. See generally Craswell, supra note 13. Cf. Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 696 (Jules Coleman &
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (arguing that deontologists and consequentialists often come up with different answers because they are answering different questions).
15. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829,830 (2003) (arguing that "economic analysis has failed to produce an 'economic theory' of contract law, and does not seem likely to be able to do so."). See generally ERIC A.
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
16. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 10; Benson, supra note 6; Richard Craswell, How We Got This
Way: Further Thoughts on Fuller and Perdue, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, June 2001, http://www.
bepress.com/ils/issl/art2; James Gordley, A Perennial Misstep: From Cajetan to Fuller and Perdue to
"Efficient Breach," ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, June 2001, http://www.bepress.com/ils/issl/art4;
Stephen A. Smith, "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages" and the Morality of Contract Law,
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, June 2001, http://www.bepress.com/ils/issl/artl.
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law. 17 Just because we would like to believe that a theory of Contract (or
a theory of anything) may be possible, just because it would be convenient if our heuristics could do more than they can do, does not mean that
we can realistically expect more theory than reality can provide. That is
the conclusion of Part II.
What remains, then, is to posit a role for theory. It may be that our
reasons for wanting theory to work are valid and that we are tempted to
expect more from theory than it can provide because more than occasionally theory works, so long as we take "works" to mean that theory
responds in the way we need it to respond. Part III engages theory and
its objects in those terms and offers a formulation of theory's role in
Contract law: What can we expect theory to do for us, and what ought we
not to expect it to do? So constrained by the limitations revealed in Parts
I and II, the role and limits of normative theory in Contract emerge.
At the outset, though, it is worthwhile, if not indispensable, to appreciate what it is we would want a theory of Contract to do, and therefor to disclose the value of theory. It may be that our theory of theory, if
you will, gets in the way. That is, we may be motivated to find a theory,
or a particular kind of theory, because we misunderstand what it is theory can do for us.
Keep in mind that theory itself is heuristic: It enables us to function
more efficiently, to "leverage" some knowledge into more or more valuable knowledge. If you can correctly identify symptoms of an illness, you
can better treat that illness. But if you misread the symptoms you may
mistreat the malady and even exacerbate its deleterious consequences.
Theory in the law works similarly. For example, once we can correctly
identify a problem as a matter of Contract rather than tort, we can apply
our Contract answers to reach the right results. But if we misconstrue
the facts before us, and apply tort principles where we should have applied Contract, we will get wrong results, or at least results inconsistent
with whatever bases we have for assuming that some questions are a matter of tort law and others a matter of Contract. 18 We must assume that
there is a method to the madness of distinguishing the consensual (Con17. For a general discussion of "doctrinal coherence," see J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 127 (1993)
("To accuse legal doctrine of incoherence is to imagine a set of legal doctrines that might be coherent;
to assert that explanations of existing doctrines are not reasonable is to appeal to distinctions and similarities that could be reasonable.").
18. A distinction between Contract and tort is found throughout the reported decisions. See,
e.g., Garland v. Davis, 45 U.S. 131, 144 (1846) ("Nor is the difference merely formal or technical between actions founded in tort and in contract."); Spence v. Omaha Indem. Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 793, 796
(5th Cir. 1993) (ruling that the National Flood and Insurance Act of 1968 applies only to contract
claims, and not tort claims); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 957-59 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussing foreseeable damages as they apply to contract actions as opposed to tort actions); McClure v.
Johnson, 69 P.2d 573, 576--78 (Ariz. 1937) (determining that an action for the negligent breach of a
contract is an action in contract, rather than tort) ; Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Corp., 384 N.Y.S.2d
479, 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (ruling that it is the responsibility of a court to determine whether the
basis of a plaintiff's case is in tort or contract).

510

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2008

tract) from the nonconsensual (tort) undertaking. And it is not mere
happenstance that we see Contract fray when the fabric of consent is
tested. 19
Professor Stephen Smith has asserted that legal theory may offer
four types of accounts of a body of law: (1) historical, (2) prescriptive, (3)
descriptive, and (4) interpretive.20 Of course, the problem of heuristic
over- and under-inclusiveness 21 would potentially undermine any of those
theoretical enterprises. We could not hold any theory to too high a standard; there will be anomalous cases. Insofar as history is a matter of cumulative and often conflicting forces, an historical theory would, arguably, have to be as broad as all of human history to be perfect. And,
further, insofar as an historical theory is just one type of descriptive theory, the same could be said of any positive theory of Contract law or anything else. A prescriptive theory, though, need not be subject to the
same shortcoming: You could say that Contract (or any other body of
law) should do whatever you think it should do.
The greatest challenge, and the object which would gain the most
ground, would be development of an interpretive theory:
Interpretive theories aim to enhance understanding of the law by
highlighting its significance or meaning.... [T]his is achieved by
explaining why certain features of the law are important or unimportant and by identifying connections between those features-in
other words, by revealing an intelligent order in the law, so far as
such an order exists.22
Certainly, an interpretive theory could "stack" or join multiple normative theories and still be "an interpretive theory." 23 Also, it does not matter that the intelligent order actually be normative, desirable, or even (in
a sense) coherent. A theory would be no less a theory because it describes how an area of law yields even normatively indefensible results.
That is, it would not be incoherent to refer to a theory of Nazi genocide
policies. All that matters is the reliability of the heuristic: does the theory discover an intelligent order?
Having set the interpretive bar at that level of discovery, it would
seem a relatively small matter to find the right language to fill out the
heuristic. But, in fact, even at a broad level of generalization, the right
19. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS§ 3.13 (3d ed. 2004).
20. STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 4-5 (2004). According to Smith, historical accounts
"reveal the law's causal history," while prescriptive accounts contemplate "the ideal law." Descriptive
accounts, of course, seek to describe the law as it is (or was). Interpretive theories "aim to enhance
understanding of the law by highlighting its significance or meaning" ; their object is to "make sense"
of the law. !d.
21. See Alces, On Discovering Doctrine, supra note 2, at 473 (discussing the heuristic over- and
under-inclusiveness of the rules and doctrine that make up areas of law).
22. SMITH, supra note 20, a t 5.
23. See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical
Integration Strategy, in SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 420 (Ernest Sosa & Enrique
Villanueva eds., 2001).
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formula is elusive. For example, you could not even be comfortable understanding Contract as the law of consensual relations in a world of
form "agreements" which are more about form than agreement. 24 So before you could formulate Contract in terms of "consensual" relations you
need to fix a sense of "consent" that reflects Contract reality. It would
be wrong to say that Contract is about nonconsensual arrangements but
just as wrong to ignore the ambiguity of contractual "consent." 25
Ultimately, though, the question considered here is this: What happens when theory fails? That is, if we conclude that the extant approaches to positing a unified theory of Contract fail, what does that
"failure" tells us about Contract? My thesis is that there is something
fundamental about Contract that dooms searches for the unified theory
to fail. But I suggest that we may learn just as much from understanding
the nature and foundations of that failure as we would from discovering a
unified theory. That is, so long as our object is to get at what animates
Contract-what explains why, and to what extent, some promises are legally enforceable-we should be indifferent about ever discovering the
grail. We have succeeded if we have discovered that there is no grail, no
unified theory. Discovering why theory fails is a contribution every bit as
valuable as would be discovering a (the?) unified theory, indeed, perhaps
more so. Discovering a unified theory of Contract would certainly tell us
something about Contract and may as well tell us something about other
areas of the law-tort and property, for instance. But if we understood
why Contract resists comprehensive theorizing then we might appreciate
something about the law generally, and we might understand how tort
and property could similarly defy theory. Also, if we conclude that tort
and property are amenable to theorizing in a way that frustrates Contract, then we would have discovered something important that distinguishes Contract from tort or property. So there is a good deal at stake
and, I argue, we heretofore may have obscured the truths to be gleaned
from imagining theory-less Contract in our quest to find the theory.
I.

THE GOVERNING HEURISTIC

Theorists have interpreted Contract in terms of reliance, 26 promise,27
and transfer. 28 There are reasons for assuming that Contract may be
premised on any of the three conceptions. We want people to rely on
promises so we describe an enforceable promise as one on which there

24. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th. Cir. 1996); see also Peter A. Alces, Guerilla
Terms, 57 Emory L.J. 1511, 1557-60 (2007) (positing a role for agreement in modern contractual contexts); Brian Bix, Background Rules, Incompleteness, and Intervention , 2004 WIS. L. REV. 379, 386
(discussing the difficulty of finding consent in a world of form contracts).
25. See infra Part I.C.l.
26. See SMITH, supra note 20, at 169.
27. See id. at 168.
28. Seeid. at171.
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has been reliance (and then we can quibble about what constitutes sufficient reliance). We can recognize, of course, that it is circular to say that
you may rely on a promise because promises are what it is reasonable to
rely upon: "This problem concerns the difficulty of explaining why a person is entitled to rely upon a promise until it is first established that the
promise is binding." 29 (And if it is binding because a person is entitled to
rely on it .... ) Nonetheless, once there has been reasonable reliancewhatever it may be that makes the reliance reasonable-you can decide
that promises should be enforced because it would be wrong (in deontological30 or consequentialist31 terms, or both) to frustrate such reasonable
reliance. Reasonable reliance is something we want to encourage, so
disappointed reliance should be redressed by Contract law.
An alternative to the reliance heuristic is the promise theory of
Contract, presented comprehensively by Professor Charles Fried,32 who
argues that a contract is an enforceable promise and that Contract law
vindicates Kantian conceptions of trust and respect. 33 Accordingly, we
enforce contracts because it would be wrong, in an important normative
sense, not to do so. 34 Fried's theory, then, need not take account of reliance and so can understand Contract in terms of expectations (which
helps us overcome the reliance-expectation damages tensions). 35 The
other real benefit of Fried's perspective is that it gives Contract work to
do that is independent of what tort law does and provides Contract results that differ from tort results. That is, a breach of contract is something other than (if not more than) a tort. The problem is, though, that
Contract seems to extend beyond the boundaries of promise. We typically draw on what we understand to be Contract principles in order to
determine the parties' Contract rights beyond the terms of their express
promises. 36
The transfer heuristic is a response to the reliance and promise
theories. Conceiving of the formation of a contract as effecting a transfer
also distinguishes Contract from tort (and so explains the difference be-

29. ATIYAH,supranotell , at37.
30. See FRIED, supra note 10.
31. ATIYAH,supra note 11, at 30-44.
32. FRIED, supra note 10.
33. /d. at 14-17.
34. /d.
35. On the tension between reliance and expectation damages, see L.L. Fuller & William R.
Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936) [hereinafter
Fuller & Perdue, Contract Damages: 1]; L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 2), 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1936) [hereinafter Fuller & Perdue, Contract Damages: 2).
36. "Just as assent may be manifested by words or other conduct, sometimes including silence, so
intention to make a promise may be manifested in language or by implication from other circumstances, including course of dealing or usage of trade vi course of performance." REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 4 cmt. a (1981); see also id. § 19 cmt. a ("[T]here is no distinction in the
effect of the promise whether it is expressed in writing, or orally, or in acts, or partly in one of these
ways and partly in others. Purely negative conduct is sometimes, though not usually, a sufficient manifestation of assent.").
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tween Contract and tort damages) and provides a means to fill in the
gaps left by the promise theory. To make sense of the transfer heuristic
as a means to discover the normative foundation of Contract, it is necessary first to appreciate transfer in its deontological context. Transfer is
distinct from and an alternative to promise and reliance theories of Contract, which would seem, at least at first, to offer more viable alternatives
if for no other reason than the fact that promise 37 and reliance 38 are embedded in the Contract lexicon. We are used to understanding Contract
as a means to enforce a promise, and we understand that promises encourage reliance. So it appears almost tautological that we may discover
Contract in promise or reliance principles, and that is where commentators first turned.
The subsections of this Part provide an overview of the reliance and
promise theories in order to present the sum and substance of the transfer theory in relief. If the transfer heuristic convinces us that reliance
and promise fail as comprehensive theories- because they do not provide a complete and coherent interpretation of Contract doctrine-then
transfer must succeed or we have failed to identify a viable theoretical
heuristic. So this Part recounts the premises of the reliance and promise
theories and the transfer theory's response to reliance and promise.
Transfer's critique of reliance and promise is convincing (indeed, we can
only understand transfer if we appreciate transfer as a response to reliance and promise), and to come to terms with the power of the transfer
heuristic we must start by understanding its relation to reliance and
promise.

A.

Contract as Basis for (and Based on) Reliance

Professors P.S. Atiyah39 and Grant Gilmore 40 both recognize the
tendency of Contract, in some settings, to merge with tort principles.
Their conclusions are positive, not normative, and acknowledge that the
merger is not complete. There certainly remains something of Contract
that survives tort analysis, but Contract has been, so far as Gilmore could
see, "fus(ed] ... in(to] a united theory of civil obligation."41 This was not
just a matter of Contract's somehow morphing into tort; on the contrary,
tort law changed during the course of the last hundred years or so42 as
Contract law was changing, and the two seemed to arrive at a very similar place, perhaps even the same place seen from different perspectives.
37. See id. § 1 (1981) ("A contract is a promise or a set of promises .. . . "); id. § 2(1) ("A promise
is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a
promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.").
38. See id. § 90 (1981) (actionable reliance); id. § 344 (allowing remedies for a party's " reliance
interest").
39. P.S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACf 8-9 (1990).
40. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 87.
41. !d. at 90. See generally ATlYAH,supra note 11.
42. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 92.
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Gilmore, as a positive matter, sees Contract liability as expanding to
overlap with the normative foundations of tort. 43 Atiyah, focusing on the
consequentialist-particularly utilitarian- perspective, appreciates a
normative justification in reliance "from principle" even in cases of
wholly executory contracts:
Promises are liable to be relied upon, and even if a promise has not
yet been relied upon, it may come to be relied upon at any time.
Moreover, the promisor will often not know whether the promise
has been relied upon. In order to better ensure that relied-upon
promises are performed, it may, therefor, be desirable to insist that
even unrelied-upon promises are performed .... One of the commonest ways of relying on a promise is to give other promises in
turn to third parties. Similarly, with legal contracts, one of the
commonest forms of action in reliance is entering into another contract with a third party which depends on the first contract. Now if
promises were generally treated as only binding where they have
been relied upon, but not where they have merely given rise to expectation, cases of this nature would raise difficulties. 44
So Atiyah establishes the basis for the enforcement of even wholly
executory contracts in reliance. We need to assume reliance even where
reliance cannot be shown with certainty because reliance is more likely
than not. Though Atiyah describes this as an argument from principle,45
it seems to be more of a positive than a normative observation.
For present purposes, the important point is that reliance, a foundation of tort law, operates simultaneously as a foundation of Contract
law. 46 There is at least ostensible doctrinal coincidence revealed by tort
and Contract law's vindication of the reliance interest, both as an element of the damages calculus and as the raison d'etre of the tort and
Contract causes of action. Tort damages are designed to put the plaintiff
in the position she would have been in but for the defendant's negligence.47 We need Contract in order that promisees may rely with some
confidence on the promises made by promisors.48 So Contract damages,
too, could be understood as assuring promisees that their reliance will be
compensated in the event the promisor breaches. It is not difficult, then,
to appreciate why Contract damages ought to vindicate reliance: clearly,
the promisee who reasonably relies (as we want to encourage her to do
in order to maximize the value of exchange) should be protected by Contract law in the event that her reliance is frustrated. If A promises to
provide B certain facilities in exchange forB's promise to pay A therefor,
43.
44.

/d. at 87-88.

ATlYAH,supra note 11, at 210-11.
45. /d. at 210.
46. See GILMORE, supra note 11, at 88-89.
47. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (West Publ'g Co. 4th ed.
1971) (1941) ("[O]ne important form of remedy for a tort is .. . the restitution of what has been wrongfully taken.").
48. Fuller & Perdue, Contract Damages: 1, supra note 35, at 53-54.
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B would be entirely justified in expending funds to realize the full value
of A's engagement. Indeed, A would want B to be assured in making
such expenditures in reliance so that B would pay A the greater amount
to secure A's promise. Both tort and Contract principles would be
served if the law compensated B in the amount of that expenditure were
A to fail to perform. By assuring B that she will be able to recover her
expenditures in reliance on A's promise should A fail to perform, the law

both accommodates reasonable reliance and provides a result that enables A to realize greater value for her undertaking. Conceived in terms
of tort, B would receive "out of pocket" damages (were we to understand A's defalcation as tortious, both unlikely and unnecessary), what it
would take to make B whole. In Contract, we would refer to B's recovering "reliance" damages. 49 So Contract founded on reliance makes obvious sense.
The challenge presented by the wholly executory promise, the subject matter of Contract alone (there is nothing from tort that could intervene), may not be so obviously soluble. After all, if I promise to sell you
my car and you take no action in reliance on that promise, you are not
hurt- but, perhaps, for a sense of disappointment- by my reneging.
And so long as my promise is not supported by consideration, you will
not be able to make out a case for breach against me without some showing of reliance, or so the Contract story goes. 50 So why should the result
be any different, from a normative perspective, in the event you do provide wholly executory consideration? Your return promise to me, unexecuted, does not result in any loss to you in the event I do not perform.
Again, at most you are disappointed, but insofar as that disappointment
49. /d. at 54.
50. It is clear that Section 90, by its terms, requires reliance for a promise not supported by consideration to be actionable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). Professor
Hillman's three-year empirical survey of promissory estoppel cases revealed that reliance maintains a
"crucial role" in the courts' analysis. Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L REV. 580. 597 (1998). Almost two
decades earlier, Professor Knapp argued that a comparison of reliance with "such modest and familiar
notions as the promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy was like putting Pavarotti in a barbershop quartet." Charles L Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory
Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 52, 53 (1981); see also Juliet P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel or Is Promissory Estoppel Really as Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It Is: A New Look at
the Data, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531 (2002) (finding a more nuanced place for reliance in promissory estoppel actions).
Nonetheless, the survival of reliance as a necessary element of a promissory estoppel action is not a
subject of universal agreement Professors Farber and Mattheson conclude that "reliance is no longer
the key to promissory estoppel. Although courts still feel constrained to speak the language of reliance, their holdings can best be understood and harmonized on other grounds." Daniel A. Farber &
John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake, " 52 U.
CHI. L REV. 903, 904 (1985). Professor Feinman similarly has argued that "promissory estoppel is no
longer an appropriate doctrine, given recent developments in the wider scheme of contract law and
theory, and thus it is time to move on." Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 304 (1992). For similar arguments, see Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1996); James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CAL L. REV. 547 (1995) ;
Edward Yorio & Steve The!, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991).
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does not have normative consequences sufficient to entail legal consequences, it is not clear why you should be able to recover. Here is where
Lon Fuller and William Perdue enter the fray.
Fuller, along with his research assistant Perdue, discover a theoretical basis of Contract in the reliance interest. Their article, The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages,51 has been described as the "most important law review article written in the United States,"52 and has served
well presenting the thesis with which myriad theories of Contract have
parted company. Given the criticism the article has elicited, it is no small
wonder that it has been recognized as such a seminal contribution. Modern commentators find little good to say about its conclusions,53 but the
piece is a semaphore, a signal that there is important work to be done on
the normative theory of Contract and the fact that the signal may misdirect has not overcome the message that the search for direction is worth
the candle.
Succinctly, and just to present summarily the premises to which
later theorists have responded, Fuller and Perdue rely on Aristotelian
conceptions of justice (actually, Fuller's conceptions of Aristotle's conceptions) to conclude that there are three "interests" vindicated by the
Contract damages law: the expectation interest, the reliance interest, and
the restitution interest. 54 Tracking Aristotle's conclusions regarding
commutative justice, Fuller and Perdue reason that Contract law cannot
justly vindicate the expectation interest because affording the nonbreaching party the benefit of his bargain would be to give that party something
he never had: the subject matter of the Contract. 55 If I promise to sell
you my watch for $100 and then breach that promise, for the law to give
you that watch (specific performance) or its value (money damages
51. Fuller & Perdue, Contract Damages: 1, supra note 35; Fuller & Perdue, Contract Damages: 2,
supra note 35.
52. Gordley, supra note 16, at 1.
53. See, e.g., Peter A. Alces, Contract Reconceived, 96 Nw. U . L. REv. 39, 50-51 (2001); Peter A.
Alces, Regret and Contract "Science, " 89 GEO. L.J. 143, 148-54, 161-63 (2000); David W. Barnes &
Deborah Zalesne, A Unifying Theory of Contract Damage Rules, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 495, 504-05,
520--21 (2005); Barnett, supra note 50, at 518-22; Benson, supra note 6, at 19-20, 23; Richard Craswell,
Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 100, 136, 153-54 (2000); Craswell, supra note 16, at
3-6, 7-8; Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 499-500
(1996); Feinman, supra note 50, at 305-08; Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method,
97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 696 {1984); Gordley, supra note 50, at 568-69; Gordley, supra note 16, at 2-3;
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1113-14, 1114 n.348
(2001); Avery Katz, Reflections on Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: A
Positive Economic Framework , 21 U. MICH. J .L. REFORM 541, 557-58, 560 (1988); Michael B. Kelly,
The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1755, 1756; Charles L. Knapp,
Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1199, 1228, 1251 (1998);
Roy Kreitner, Fear of Contract, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 429, 468; Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1443 (2004); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After
Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 871, 878 (2003); Smith, supra note 16, at 17, 2425; Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Past Consideration, 78 VA. L. REV. 1045,
1048-50, 1073-75 (1992); Yorio & Thel, supra note 50, at 160-61 , 167.
54. Fuller & Perdue, Contract Damages: 1, supra note 35, at 54.
55. !d. at 52-53.
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measured by the "benefit of the bargain") is to give you something you
never had ab initio. All you had prior to performance-my delivery of
the watch and your payment therefor-was an expectancy. So when I
breached I did not deprive you of the res, of anything you already had in
any substantial sense. All I deprived you of was an inchoate right to
ownership of the watch. And insofar as the law should not operate but
to avoid harm, 56 the Contract law should not enforce the bare promise
without some showing of harm.
Professor James Gordley, an important Aristotelian scholar and
theorist, takes issue with Fuller and Perdue's reading of Aristotle. 57
Gordley can appreciate the argument "that the promisee has something
like a property right in his 'expectancy."'58 Because both promisors' and
promisees' interests would best be served by recognizing the creation of
such a right at the time of contracting, the law, consistent with Aristotelian principles, can find and enforce such a right in order to give full effect to the parties' purposes. 59 So where Fuller and Perdue see the law
chasing its own tail-" A promise has present value, why? Because the
law enforces it."60 -Gordley (and others61 ) find a means to avoid that circularity by recognizing the interest of the parties- both promisee and
promisor- in the enforceability of the wholly executory promise. So
conceived, there is no clash with the harm principle. 62 This conclusion
engages too a species of the transfer heuristic, considered below. 63
Stephen Smith identifies another problem with the reliance model:
it fails to account for the role of promise in Contract law.64 That is, if re56. See Smith, supra note 16, at 8 (footnotes omitted):
The harm principle states that it is illegitimate for the state to interfere with an individual's liberty
unless that individual has harmed (or is about to harm) another individual. Enforcing promises
qua promises is inconsistent with this principle, it is said, because a promissory obligation is an
obligation to benefit another rather than an obligation not to harm another.... [E]nforcing
promises is like enforcing an obligation to give to charity. Keeping a promise, like giving to charity, is praiseworthy-a mark of good character-but a failure to do so should not, in itself, concern the law (or at least not be of concern to the law dealing with individual 's private relations).
Smith relied on John Stuart Mill for articulation of the "harm principle." See JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 10-11 (David Spitz ed., 1975) (1859).
Smith also cites in this regard Joseph Raz's review of P.S. Atiyah's PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW.
See Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 937 (1982). There, Raz observed that "[i)t follows from the harm principle that enforcing voluntary obligations is not itself a
proper goal for contract law. To enforce voluntary obligations is to enforce morality through the legal
imposition of duties on individuals. In this respect it does not differ from the legal proscription of
pornography." /d.
57. James Gordley, Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition, in THE THEORY OF CONTRAcr
LAW: NEW ESSAYS 265, 328 (Peter Benson ed. , 2001 ).
58. /d. at 328 n.279; see also Gordley, supra note 16, at 7.
59. Compare Hume's argument that promises arise only from human convention: "It is only a
general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another,
and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules." HUME,supra note 5, at 314-15.
60. Fuller & Perdue, Contract Damages: 1, supra note 35, at 59.
61. See, e.g. , JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 345 (1972); fRIED, supra note 10, at 16.
62. See supra note 56.
63. See infra Part I. C.
64. SMITH, supra note 20, at 80-82.
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liance provides the sum and substance of Contract, why is it necessary
that the reliance proceed from a promise made by one party to another?
In the tort law-the negligent misrepresentation law. specifically-the
party who misrepresents a fact may be liable to the party who reasonably
relies thereon.65 The misrepresentation of fact suffices to support recovery of damages measured by the disappointed plaintiff's loss .(out of
pocket loss) in reliance on the misstatement. 66 Because the basis of liability is negligence, there is no required showing that the defendant intended to mislead. The line between breach of promise- the basis of
Contract breach-and negligent misrepresentation is fine, indeed.67 The
questions, then, are why the law needs two conceptions of liability (both
breach of Contract and negligent misrepresentation) vindicating the
same normative bases, and why the damage mea·sure for the two (expectation for Contract, reliance for negligence) should not be the same. So
the reliance theory of Contract presents a conundrum: It denies Contract
a justification independent of tort.
The conundrum is not resolved when you say that it is the promise
wh~ch distinguishes Contract from tort. 68 First, of course, those who subscribe to reliance theories have denied that promise provides the answer.69 At best, promise provides a basis for reliance, but there is nothing
unique about promise that accomplishes reliance. The whole premise of
negligent misrepresentation law, of fraud law for that matter, is that
statements that are not promises may provoke reliance the law should
protect. 70 Those who would find the basis of Contract liability in reliance
must come to terms with the uneasy tension between the Contract and
(negligent) misrepresentation actions. Second, promissory estoppel recognizes that a promise followed by reliance may be actionable.71 Therefore, a promise not followed by reliance is not actionable on promissory
estoppel grounds but is nonetheless actionable on Contract grounds so
long as the promise was supported by consideration. 'Indeed, while the
presumptive measure of damages for breach of Contract is expectation,72
liability based on promissory estoppel where reliance is requisite73 may be
in the amount necessary to reimburse the plaintiff for her reliance loss. 74
65. PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTlONS §§ 2:21-:22 (2006).
66. /d.
67. See generally JoEI!en Mitchell-Lockyer, Common Law Misrepresentation in Sales Cases-An
Argument for Code Dominance, 19 FORUM 361,389-90 (1984) .
68. Seeid.
69. See Randy E. Barnett, The Richness of Contract Theory, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1413 (1999) (reviewing ROBERT HILLMAN , THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW (1997)).
70. ALCES,supra note 65, §§ 2:21-:22.
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) (1981).
72. See id. at§ 347 cmt. a ("Contract damages are ordinarily based on the injured party' s expectation interest . . . ."); E . ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 756-57 (3d ed. 1999); 11 JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 55.3 (2005).
73. At least in theory. See supra note 50.
74. See Kajima!Ray Wilson v. L.A. County Me tro. Transp. Auth ., 1 P.3d 63, 68-73 (Cal. 2000)
(holding that a contractor could recover in promissory estoppel for the cost of preparing a bid incurred
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If the reliance principles alone (as posited by Fuller and Perdue and
rationalized by Gilmore and Atiyah) fail to offer a comprehensive theory
of Contract/5 insofar as reliance cannot account for the wholly executory
promise, we do not supply the comprehensive theory by demonstrating
that Contract is more than reliance. We need a normative theory that
can account for both reliance and expectation. Here Charles Fried's contribution is apposite.

B.

Contract as Promise76

In his seminal Contract As Promise/7 Fried offers "a theory of contractual obligation" that posits the normative coextensiveness of Contract with what he terms "the promise principle":
There exists a convention that defines the practice of promising and
its entailments. This convention provides a way that a person may
create expectations in others. By virtue of the basic Kantian principles of trust and respect, it is wrong to invoke that convention in
order to make a promise, and then to break it. 78
In other words, Contract law keeps us from breaking promises that Kant
would have us keep.
Fried then uses his promise principle as the measure of Contract
doctrine. 79 After presenting the principle, he tracks its operation in terms
of consideration, offer and acceptance, gaps in the contract, good faith,
and duress and unconscionability.80 But for Fried it all starts with the
promise, and the moral force of promise provides the normative foundation of Contract.81 We cannot discover that normative foundation in the
benefits we realize from the Contract convention or from the reliance
that promising engenders because, while "benefit and reliance are
[largely consequentialist] attempts to explain the force of a promise in
terms of its two most usual effects, ... the attempts fail because these effects depend on the prior assumption of the force of the commitment. " 82
And for that, "the force of the commitment," we need deontology rather
than consequentialism.

in reliance on the promise, but not for the expected profits from the venture); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) {1981); Appendix, 4 A.L.I. PROC. 98-99 (1926).
75. Professor Smith observes that no one has ever tried to formulate a comprehensive theory of
Contract based on reliance. SMITH, supra note 20, at 78.
76. In his Contract Theory, Smith places discussion of Fried's promise theory before discussion
of reliance, as though reliance were a response to promise rather than, chronologically, the other way
around. Jd. at 71. Smith does, however, challenge the position that promise is a necessary condition
for the creation of a reliance-based duty as "difficult to defend." Id. at 80.
77. FRIED, supra note 10.
78. Jd. at 17.
79. See id. at 28-112.
80. /d.
81. See id. at 7-14.
82. ld. at 12.
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Apart, though, from promise theory's incompleteness-its inability
to account comprehensively for all of the constituent rules of Contractpromise fails more fundamentally: promise necessarily entails agreement
and agreement in turn entails bargain.83 It would be very difficult to
make much sense of a good deal (perhaps the majority) of what passes as
contemporary Contract and Contract liability if one takes agreement too
seriously.84 Commentators have not explored in depth the theoretical
challenge to Contract that evisceration of "agreement" presents.
While Smith avers that it is the objective approach that most significantly challenges promise theory, he is able to overcome the challenge,
for reasons best recounted in the margin. 85 But I think Smith misses the
bigger problem of constructive agreement when he defends the objective
theory of Contract.86 When "agreement" means no more than "apparent
agreement" the problem is not that we are relying on the promisor's
manifest intent rather than her actual intent to fix promissory liability,
though that too is a problem (which I am not convinced Smith overcomes).87 The greater problem is revealed by returning to the reliancebased critique offered by Gilmore88 and Atiyah. 89 In The Death of Contract, Gilmore notes and formulates well the transformation of Contract
into a matter of status rather than real agreement.90 As Contract liability
became "objectified," freed of the detritus of subjective considerations
such as "actual intent," it became easier to resolve Contractual disputes
on the basis of law rather than fact. 91 So "agreement" does not mean
"agreement"; it means something more like "providing a defensible basis
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 1, 2(1), 3 (1981) (indicating the interrelatedness of promise, agreement, and bargain).
84. I am here assuming that we can get past the problem, noted by Smith, that the law generally
enforces agreements, but not-with few exceptions-"mere promises." SMITH, supra note 20, at 6365; see also Brian H. Bix, Contract Law Theory 9 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-12, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=892783
(noting that much of the law of Contracts is "aimed at distinguishing enforceable bargains from unenforceable 'mere' promises").
85. Smith distinguishes "the kind of intention required to make a promise and the kind of intention that matters in determining the content" of a promise:
[S)ubjective intentions are what count in determining whether a promise was made at all: a promise cannot be made without intending to make a promise. . . . [H)owever, the content of a promise
is, on both the ordinary and philosophical understanding of promises, determined objectively. In
interpreting a promise, as in interpreting normal communications, the aim is not to determine
what the promisor intended, but what the promisor actually meant-which is determined "objectively." If this view of promising is correct . . . the objective approach is inconsistent with promis·
sory theories only insofar as it applies to the intention to make a contract.
SMITH, supra note 20, at 61-62.
86. ld. at 60-62.
87. Smith, supra note 16, at 20-21,35.
88. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 65-66.
89. ATIYAH, supra note 11 , at 66.
90. GILMORE, supra note 11.
91. Gilmore argued that this was the Holmesian vision: If "we can restrict ourselves to the 'externals' (what the parties 'said' or 'did'), then the factual inquiry will be much simplified and in time
can be dispensed with altogether as courts accumulate precedents about recurring types of permissible
and impermissible 'conduct."' /d. at 42.
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to impose Contract liability." And what is defensible is a matter of the
deontological-consequentialist tension.
The recent scholarly focus on so-called form agreements has revealed a disregard for, perhaps even impatience with, inquiries regarding
subjective intent in the case of "boilerplate."92 The question is whether
consumers of form contracts (who may be but are not necessarily "consumers" in the "personal, family, or household sense"93) are as a class
better off with boilerplate terms than without them. Do the benefits of
focusing on the "big picture" overcome the costs of disregarding the lack
of actual agreement? It is not necessary to resolve that issue here; what
matters to a promise theory of Contract is that the question is deemed
pertinent at all. If it is not necessary to find a promise-in the sense of a
subjectively comprehended consensual undertaking-to establish the basis of Contract liability, then a promise theory of Contract necessarily
fails. While we may enlist Contract-like principles to resolve interpersonal disputes, if the premise of one of the party's responsibility is not a
conscious consensual undertaking, we are not talking about Contract in
terms to which a promise theory could realistically pertain. 94 Fried reminds us that "[t]he moral force behind contract as promise is autonomy:
the parties are bound to their contract because they have chosen to be. " 95
To the extent, then, that promise theory is premised on autonomy, the
enforceability of form contracts would seem to contradict any suggestion
that promise can explain all of what we understand Contract to be.
We do not need to find that all courts reviewing so-called form
agreements reflexively enforce them to reach the conclusion that promise
is an anachronism. Even if we were to establish irrefutably that form
contracts and the boilerplate they contain are ultimately "good" for
those on whom they are imposed, that would not respond to the obstacle
such contracts present for the viability of a promise theory of Contract.
It is enough that a significant body of Contract cases (as well as established business practices and governmental regulation) is quite willing to
92. See, e.g. , Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (2006);
Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REv. 933 (2006); Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Preferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105 (2006); David Gilo &
Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of
Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983
(2006); Robert A . Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of £-Standard
Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REv. 837 (2006); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An
Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857 (2006); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Ronald J. Mann, "Contracting" for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899 (2006); Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts:
Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175 (2006).
93. S ee generally John J .A . Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach , 24 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 290 (2000) (stating form contracts account for more than ninety-nine percent of
commercial and consumer transactions).
94. Cf Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164, 166--{)7 (Ark. 1907) (imposing liability on the basis of
restitution where the defendant received benefits while unconscious).
95. FRIED, supra note 10, at 57.
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find Contract liability without a promise, in any real sense. In fact, Fried
himself, after a fashion, acknowledges the effect that evisceration of actual subjective intent would have on a promise theory, recognizing that
filling the (inevitable). gaps in contracts entails a necessary departure
from promise principles: "It would be irrational to ignore the gaps in
contracts, to refuse to fill them. It would be irrational not to recognize
contractual accidents and to refuse to make adjustments when they occur. The gaps cannot be filled, the adjustments cannot be governed, by
the promise principle."96 If the filling of contractual gaps cannot he "governed[] by the promise principle," 97 it is very difficult to see how the
promise principle can account for what may be the most typkal contract
behavior: form contracting, where the very essence of the institution is
that it is irrational to read.98
Insofar as the viability of any unitary theory is concerned, however,
we encounter something in the form contract controversy that, though
not unique in Contract, does get to the heart of the theoretical challenge.
That is, some courts enforce boilerplate and other courts, on indistinguishable facts, refuse to do so. The reasons the conflicting courts give
for their conclusions reflect diametrically opposed conceptions of what
Contract is about. Consider two recent cases concerning form terms in
consumer agreements: Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.99 and Klocek v. Gateway, Inc. 100 Hill was decided three years before Klocek and by a higher
court in the federal system. Nonetheless, Judge Vratil (Klocek) disagrees
with Judge Easterbrook's conclusions regarding Contract law, and their
differences are not a matter of the two jurisdictions' variations in the underlying Contract rules or dispositive differences in the factual predicates
each case concerned. At bottom, their disagreement truly is of theoretical proportion.
Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Hill emphasizes the efficacy and
therefore the principled foundation of form contracting. The issue was
whether the Hills could be bound to a term in the documents shipped to
them with a computer they purchased over the phone.101 The alternative
to the seller's use of the form at issue would have been the seller's representative explaining orally over the phone to the consumer (at the time
the consumer called to place the order for the computer) the sum and
96. /d. at 69.
97. /d.
98. See Randy E . Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 631 (2002)
(noting that, because it is difficult for most consumers to judge the likelihood that the remote contingencies described in standard forms will occur, "the rational course is to focus on the few terms that
are generally well publicized and of immediate concern, and to ignore the rest") ; Robert A. Hillman,
Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 746-47 (2002) (observing that, given that the consumer
expects that nothing will go wrong with the product and, if it does, that the law will provide protection
from harsh terms, "the consumer has good reason not to read the form").
99. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
· 100. 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
101. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
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substance of the consumer's rights in the event the seller's tender was in
breach. 102 In the litigation, the Hills were trying to avoid the arbitration
to which Gateway said they were bound on account of their failure to return the computer within thirty days of their receipt of it in response to
their unwillingness to "agree" to the arbitration term. 103 This, Easterbrook concludes, would be ill-advised:
If the staff at the other end of the phone for direct-sales operations
such as Gateway's had to read the four-page statement of terms before taking the buyer's credit card number, the droning voice would
anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers. Others
would hang up in rage over the waste of their time. And oral recitation would not avoid customer's assertions (whether true or
feigned) that the clerk did not read term X to them, or that they did
not remember or understand it. 104 ••• Customers as a group are better off when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephone recitation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return device. Competent adults are bound by such documents, read or
unread. 105
Easterbrook's 'argument is an argument from efficacy, not from Contract
theory or even, it would seem, from Contract law. In his Hill opinion, he
relies extensively on his earlier opinion in ProCD Incorporated v. Zeidenberg,106 a decision concerning the effect of forms between (what
turned out to be) businesses. Zeidenberg's argument was that the contract between ProCD and him was formed when he paid for the package
of ProCD software he purchased from a retail store. 107 The terms contained in the box and revealed each time Zeidenberg used the software
precluded his reselling the information contained on the software (essentially a nationwide telephone directory). 108 Nonetheless, Zeidenberg did
so and ProCD brought a breach of license action. 109 Zeidenberg responded that he never agreed to the terms of the license. 110 Judge
Easterbrook, in the course of offering a most dubious construction of the
apposite commerciallaw,111 opines on the value of form contracting:
102. /d.
103. /d.
104. While it is not worthwhile to pursue this line of criticism at length here, it may be worthwhile
to note that vendors who take orders over the phone have, for years, been able to and in fact have recorded conversations "for [ostensibly] training purposes." And as for Easterbrook's concern that the
buyer's memory or understanding would fail, Contract law does not impose a memory requirement,
only the presence of objective indicia of understanding. As to whether the fact that Contract operates
in the objective rather than the subjective realm presents a problem for a promise theory of Contract,
see SMITH, supra note 20, at 60-62.
105. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149 (emphasis added).
106. 86 F.3d 1447 {7th Cir. 1996).
107. /d. at 1450.
108. /d.
109. /d.
110. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeiderberg, 908 F. Supp. 640,645 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
111. He misunderstands the application and operation of U.C.C. § 2-204 (2003) {which deals with
the timing, rather than existence, of an acceptance), § 2-207 (which applies even in the case of a single
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Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the
software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable (a right that the
license expressly extends), may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers alike .... Ours is not a case in which a
consumer opens a package to find an insert saying 'you owe us an
extra $10,000,' and the seller files suit to collect. Any buyer finding
such a demand can prevent formation of the contract by returning
the package, as can any consumer who concludes that the terms of
the license make the software worth less than the purchase price. 112
Just to clarify the Contract law, a consumer who found such a "you owe
us $10,000" term might well be justified in thinking that the preexisting
duty rule 113 would protect her. For Easterbrook's analysis to work, he
needs to ignore (or deny) the operation of that rule. But assume for a
moment that the problem does not involve modification. What then is
Easterbrook's point in saying that "[o]urs is not a case in which a consumer opens a package to find an insert saying 'you owe us an extra
$10,000"'? 114 It would seem that his analysis would not change one bit if
that were the case. In either event, Easterbrook posits that the consumer's recourse would be to return the package. But the point, of
course, is what you do about the consumer who does not read any of the
forms included with the packaging, does not object to the term he never
saw (assuming that, as traditional Contract conceptions would provide,
he is not bound by what he has not agreed to) and is sued for $10,000. If
the preexisting duty rule is read out of the Contract law (or is inapposite
because you are bound to terms to which you have not actually agreed, at
least in any meaningful objective sense) then the consumer's failure to
return the package would result, we must assume, in a judgment against
the consumer for $10,000. While that result might seem curious, at least,
the important point here, recall, is theoretical: Contract liability, in the
Seventh Circuit and, to be fair, beyond, 115 does not require substantial
agreement.

form) , and § 2-606 (which concerns acceptance of contract subject matter, goods, not acceptance of
offers at the formation stage).
112. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeiderberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
113. Under the preexisting duty rule, "when a party merely does what he has already obligated
himself to do, he cannot demand an additional compensation therefor" Lingenfelder v. Wainwright
Brewery Co., 15 S.W. 844, 848 (Mo. 1891); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73
(1981) ("Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of
honest dispute is not consideration ....").
114. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
115. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (upholding a forum
selection clause on a cruise ticket); Reynolds-Naughton v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 386 F.3d 1, 2
(1st Cir. 2004) (same); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d .l291, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (upholding a
forum selection clause on a form contract concerning the sale of seeds); Adobe Systems, Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1052-53 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (upholding a shrink-wrap agreement similar to that in Pro CD); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 307
(Wash. 2000) (same).
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Now turn to another reaction to the same fundamental Contract
agreement question. In Klocek, United States District Court Judge
Vratil confronts the same issue that Easterbrook confronted in Hill: the
effect of an arbitration clause hidden in the plain sight of a form. The
document included with the Gateway product provided that "[b]y keeping your Gateway 2000 computer system beyond five (5) days after the
date of delivery, you accept these Terms and Conditions." 116 Among the
terms and conditions was a paragraph providing that any dispute between the purchaser of the computer and Gateway would be "settled exclusively and finally by arbitration. " 117 Gateway then mailed the plaintiff
as well as all existing customers in the United States a copy of Gateway's
quarterly magazine, "which contained notice of a change in the arbitration policy set forth in the Standard Terms. " 118
Judge Vratil understands the issue to be whether such standard
terms, delivered in a "my way or the highway" form, could be part of the
parties' agreement, and begins her analysis by noting the split among the
courts that had considered the issue. 119 After recognizing Easterbrook's
error in concluding that UCC section 2-207 is inapposite in single-form
cases, Vratil applies the provision and finds that "[b]ecause plaintiff
[buyer] is not a merchant, additional or different terms contained in the
Standard Terms did not become part of the parties' agreement unless
plaintiff expressly agreed to them." 120 That application of section 2-207,
and in fact the provision's application in nonmerchant contracts generally, certainly mirrors the common law: one cannot be subject to an
agreement unless there has been agreement. 121 UCC section 2-207
changes that result only in the case of certain transactions involving merchants.122 Gateway certainly agreed with that understanding of the law
insofar as Gateway argued that the plaintiff-buyer had in fact manifested

116. Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1335 (D. Kan. 2000).
117. !d.
118. !d. at 1335 n.l.
119. See id. at 1337-38 (comparing Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.
1991) ("printed terms on computer software package not part of agreement"), Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v.
Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 766 (D. Ariz. 1993) (license agreement shipped with computer
software not part of agreement), and U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc. , 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1207 (D.
Kan. 1998) (single use restriction on product package not binding agreement), with Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (arbitration provision shipped with computer binding on
buyer), ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455 (shrink-wrap license binding on buyer), and M.A. Mortenson Co., v.
Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 312-14 (Wash. 2000) (following Hill and ProCD on license
agreement supplied with software)); id. at 1339 n.9 (citing Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No.
16913, 2000 WL 307369, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2000) (arbitration provision shipped with computer is
binding); Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., No. 98C-09-064-RRC, 1999 WL 1442014, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct.
Sept. 3, 1999) (warranty disclaimer included inside computer Zip drive packaging conspicuous and
binding); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569. 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (same); Levy v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 1997 WL 823611 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 12, 1997) (same); M.A. Mortensen, 998 P.2d
at 312-14).
120. /d. at 1341.
121. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
122. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
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agreement by retaining the computer beyond the five days provided by
the Standard Terms in the sales documentation. 123 But Gateway failed to
demonstrate ·that the buyer had ever agreed to any of the Standard
Terms, including the terms that would have provided the basis to impute
agreement. 124
The point is, then, that the ProCD, Hill, and Klocek courts all uri~
derstand (for different reasons) that UCC section 2-207's ability to overcome the common law and impute into a contract terms upon which the
parties have not expressly agreed does not provide the means to determine what in fact the agreement was between the buyer and seller.
Where the decisions diverge is between Easterbrook's understanding of
what may constitute "agreement" (revealed in ProCD and Hill) and
Vratil's understanding of the same fundamental Contract concept in
Klocek. So promise theory's claim to explain very much of Contract law
is frustrated: We are not even sure that promise plays any role in Contract at all. If that were not so, then Easterbrook and Vratil would have
had much less reason (and ability) to offer such divergent views of the
legal relations before them.
Does transfer succeed where promise fails?
C.

Contract as Transfer

The conception of Contract as a matter of "transfer," rather than reliance or promise, is most often associated with the work of Professors
Randy Barnett125 and, separately, Peter Benson,126 each of whom have
found that appreciating Contract in light of property principles provides
the best justification for Contract doctrine. Barnett understands Contract as a matter of consent, in essentially libertarian terms. 127 Benson
too sees Contract as matter of consent, but differently. 128 Each must be
treated seriatim.

a

123. /d.
124. "The Court finds that the act of keeping the computer past five days was not sufficient to
demonstrate that plaintiff expressly agreed to the Standard Terms." /d. at 1341.
125. Barnett, supra note 12, at 292; see also Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable
Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y 179, 184 (1986); Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1223, 1242 (1984) (reviewing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACfS (1982)).
126. Benson, supra note 6, at 27.
127. Barnett writes:
The function of an entitlements theory based on individual rights is to define the boundaries
within which individuals may live, act, and pursue happiness free of the forcible interference of
others. A theory of entitlements specifies the rights that individuals possess or may possess; it
tells us what may be owned and who owns it; it circumscribes the individual boundaries of human
freedom.
Barnett, supra note 12, at 291.
128. Benson, supra note 6, at 31.
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Contract as Consent

Barnett's theory would be more fundamental than Contract theories dependent on "concepts of will, reliance, efficiency, fairness, or bargain."129 We cannot understand Contract unless we first understand
"more fundamental issues, namely the nature and sources of individual
entitlements and the means by which they come to be acquired. " 130 Barnett is interested in determining when we can derive individual rights
(Contract rights) from an entitlement theory, a moral theory.
Consent, for Barnett, is a "moral prerequisite to contractual obligation."131 But to support his theory of Contract based on consent, he
needs to develop a sense of consent that is consonant with his normative
theory of entitlement. That leads him, inexorably, to an objective theory
of consent. He acknowledges at the outset that "consent" would, "at first
blush," seem to intimate a "will" theory of Contract. 132 But will theory
fails to account for myriad contracts cases in which courts are enforcing
the objective rather than subjective will of the contracting parties. 133 In
the final reckoning, we must adopt an objective theory of Contract because the limits of human social intercourse leave us no alternative but to
do so.
In contract law, ... an assent to alienate rights must be manifested in some manner by one party to the other to serve as a criterion of enforcement. Without a manifestation of consent that is accessible to all affected parties, that aspect of a system of
entitlements that governs transfers of rights will fail to achieve its
main function. At the time of the transaction, it will have failed to
identify clearly and communicate to both parties (and to third parties) the rightful boundaries that must be respected. Without such
communication, parties to a transaction (and third parties) cannot
accurately ascertain what constitutes rightful conduct and what constitutes a commitment on which they can rely. Disputes that might
otherwise have been avoided will occur, and the attendant uncertainties of the transfer process will discourage reliance. 134
Contract is animated by objective consent, then, because we cannot reliably determine subjective consent and we need to be able to determine
consent in order for Contract to do what Contract needs to do to vouchsafe the system of entitlements Barnett deems crucial to human thriving.
So Barnett does fashion a theory of Contract that is not dependent on
the will theory, which never did seem to explain Contract very well. It
certainly is difficult to reconcile subjective will with an objective theory
129. Barnett, supra note 12, at 293.
130. /d.
131. /d. at 297.
132. /d. at 300. Barnett associates the "will theory" with Morris R. Cohen, David Hume, A.S.
Burrows, P.S. Atiyah, and Charles Fried. /d. at 272-74 nn.7-16.
133. /d. at 274.
134. /d. at 302 (emphasis omitted).
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of Contract formation. But does Barnett's objective theory of consent
explain Contract well enough to make sense of extant Contract doctrine?
It does not.
While Barnett's theory could work on a normative level- there is
no prima facie reason why you could not argue for a construction of Contract that would serve the libertarian principles he champions-the theory is problematic on a positive level. There are just too many Contract
doctrines and too many judicial constructions of Contract doctrine that
gainsay consent as Barnett formulates it for us to conclude that his consent theory tells us very much that is helpful. 135 Consider even the most
familiar doctrines: consideration and bargain.
In order to find that a promise is enforceable, it must be the case
that the promisor received consideration from the promisee on account
of the promise: consideration, the bargained-for exchange, or quid pro
quo. 136 Although it is not difficult to find cases in which courts have enforced promises notwithstanding the ostensible failure of consideration, 137 there is no controversy so far as the essential doctrine is concerned: All the consent in the world will not take the place of
consideration. No matter how much the promisor consents to be obligated in Contract to the promisee, the promisee will not be able to enforce that promise- consensually undertaken- if the promisee has not
given the promisor some consideration to support the promisor's undertaking.138 Barnett sees the consideration doctrine as entirely consistent
with a consent theory of Contract: "The voluntary use of a recognized
formality by a promisor manifests to a promisee an intention to be legally
bound in as unambiguous a manner as possible." 139 But he then acknowledges that "[t]he current rule that the falsity of [a statement reciting consideration] permits a court to nullify a transaction because of a
lack of consideration is therefore contrary to a consent theory of contract."140 Of course that "current rule" is more than merely inconsistent
with the consent theory of Contract; it undermines it altogether. If consent really defined Contract, then we would never need consideration in
any form to support a promise. It would be enough for the promisor to

135. See 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACfS § 4:1 (4th ed. 2004) (explaining that consent "is to be
judged only by overt acts and words rather than by the hidden or secret intentions of the parties").
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 71 (1981).
137. See, e.g. , Cyberchron Corp. v. Calldata Sys. Dev., Inc., 47 F.3d 39 {2d Cir. 1995) {treating as
an enforceable promise a contractor's assurances to a subcontractor, despite the absence of consideration); Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935) {enforcing a promise of lifetime support
despite a lack of consideration); Shiffman v. Atlas Mill Supply Inc., 14 Cal. Rptr. 708 {Ct. App. 1961)
{holding the question of consideration immaterial to an executed promise).
138. 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACfS § 7:1 {4th ed. 2004).
139. Barnett, supra note 12, at 311.
140. /d. at 312 (footnotes omitted).
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say "I consent to be legally bound by my promise." That is what the outdated law of seals effectively accomplished. 141
Consideration, though, is a deal-policing mechanism, even a means
for a court to avoid enforcement of a promise should that be what the
court wants to do. 142 Further, Barnett simply cannot account for the unenforceability of gift promises. If consent is all that matters, why is the
knowing and consensual promise to give a gift not enforceable? Barnett's apparent response would seem to be that consideration serves a
channeling function 143: "Within a consent theory, bargained-for consideration would perform a channeling role." 144 "Bargain," he acknowledges, is sufficient to demonstrate satisfaction of that channeling function, and he cites UCC Section 2-204(1) to support his conclusion that
the contemporary sales law requires only as much consideration as is
necessary to find the requisite bargain. 145 The section provides that "[a]
contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract." 146 But here his reliance on the UCC may be
misplaced. First, the section he cites concerns what may constitute an
"agreement": the sufficient meeting of the minds with regard to an existing bargain that would support judicial enforcement.147 The consideration and agreement requirements are separate. Agreement alone will
not make a contract enforceable unless the consideration requirement is
also satisfied; concomitantly, consideration alone will not suffice if there
is not agreement. 148 If I agree to give you $5000 and you to take it, there
is not yet an enforceable promise, a contract. There is an agreement between us, but no consideration supporting my undertaking. Similarly, if I
in fact give you $5000 but you nonetheless do not give me the car you
own and that I want there is no contract because you never agreed to

141. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941) (arguing the
formality of producing a seal was "a check against inconsiderate action" as well as "an excellent device
for inducing the circumspective frame of mind appropriate in one pledging his future").
142. See Renney v. Kimberly, 86 S.E.2d 217,219 (Ga. 1955) (citing a lack of consideration as justification for refusing to uphold a promise to relinquish all claim to a tract of land, when the promisor
had no actual claim to the land); Fuller, supra note 141, at 799 (suggesting that consideration is, among
other things, a way for courts to avoid enforcing poorly planned promises).
143. Barnett finds that consent is expressed by '"channel[ing]' one's behavior through the use of a
legal formality in such a way as to explicitly convey a certain meaning-that of having an intention to
be legally bound-to another." Barnett, supra note 12, at 310. Barnett cites Fuller, who notes that
legal formality "offers a legal framework into which the party may fit his actions, or, to change the
figure, it offers channels for the legally effective expression of intention." Fuller, supra note 141, at
801.
144. Barnett, supra note 12, at 313. In support of his conclusion, Barnett quotes RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 cmt. a (1981): "Since the principle that bargains are binding is widely
understood and is reinforced in many situations by custom and convention, the fact of bargain ...
tends to satisfy the cautionary and channeling functions of form."
145. Barnett, supra note 12, at 313.
146. u.c.c. § 2-204(1) (2003).
147. /d.
148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 17 (1981).
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give me the car in exchange for the money. No court would force you to
give me the car, though I should be able to get my money back. What is
lacking is the coincidence of agreement and consideration; one without
the other just will not do.
The reason the Code provision Barnett cites, section 2-204, seems to
subsume the consideration requirement is because it relies on the word
"sale"- "a contract for the sale of goods. " 149 That term is separately defined in article 2 in a manner that makes clear its relation to consideration. Where there has been a sale there has been consideration: "A 'sale'
consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price." 150
"Sale," then, means an exchange of consideration. So section 2-104's reference to "agreement" does not supplant the common law consideration
requirement, as Barnett intimates; instead, it clearly incorporates it. To
the extent that Barnett relies on article 2 of the Code to support the positive aspect of his consent theory of Contract, his argument is infirm.
Barnett then turns to reliance to find his consent perspective immanent in the Contract law's deference to reliance when consideration fails:
"Expenditures made by a promisee in reliance on the words and conduct
of the promisor may prove as much about the nature of this transaction
as the existence of consideration, especially where the reliance is or
should be known to the promisor." 151 Of course only reliance of which
the promisor is aware can provide the basis to enforce the promisor's
promise, or so section 90 of the Second Restatement provides. 152 Barnett
finds sufficient consent from reliance of which the promisor is aware. 153
There is not much to quibble with here. It may well be that reliance,
knowingly cultivated, can serve the same function as consideration; indeed, it may be that such reliance is an even more accurate indicator of
the parties' actual consent. There is something more obviously normative about a rule that protects someone who has relied on a promisor's
statement when the promisor intended to elicit just that type of reliance
than is the case when more formal consideration supports the promise.
While adequacy of consideration is not determinative (though sufficiency
is 154), there is an ethical (and equitable) tug at the fabric of Contract
when a promisee tries to enforce a promise supported by sufficient but
inadequate consideration. 155
149. Barnett, supra note 12, at 313.
150. u.c.c. § 2-106 (2003).
151. Barnett, supra note 12, at 314.
152. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) (1981).
153. See Barnett, supra note 12, at 276.
154. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. St. Louis Gaslight Co., 70 Mo. 69, 115 (1879) ("It is not necessary
that a consideration should be adequate in point of value to make it sufficient."); Emberson v. Hartley,
762 P.2d 364, 366 n.2 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (distinguishing between adequacy and sufficiency of consideration).
155. In equity, adequacy of consideration is sometimes deemed pertinent and determinative. See,
e.g. , Newman v. Freitas, 61 P. 907, 908 (Cal. 1900) ("[W]hile there was a consideration sufficient to
support the contract at law, yet there was no adequate consideration, and that consequently a court of
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But a problem remains for Barnett if he wants to demonstrate that
consideration and promissory estoppel serve the same consent function
in Contract, and it is a problem identified by Professor Williston at the
time of the promulgation of the First Contracts Restatement. Recall the
famous colloquy between Williston and Frederick Coudert. 156 For present purposes it does not matter that Coudert's view ultimately prevailed
in the Second Restatement's iteration of the Promissory Estoppel doctrine,157 what matters is Williston's fundamental observation concerning
the relationship between consideration and reliance theories of Contract:
Either the promise is binding or it is not. If the promise is binding it
has to be enforced as it is made. As I said to Mr. Coudert, I could
leave this whole thing to the subject of quasi contracts so that the
promisee under the circumstances shall never recover on the promise but he shall recover such an amount as will fairly compensate
him for any injury incurred; but it seems to me you have to take one
leg or the other. You have either to say the promise is binding or
you have to go on the theory of restoring the status quoY8
Insofar as Barnett finds that consideration and reliance theories of
Contract are coextensive, that both vindicate consent, he needs to find
some explanation in Contract law to distinguish the damage calculi for
each. If both consideration and reliance provide bases to enforce promises because they both indicate consent, why would Contract law distinguish the damage measures in the event the expectations generated by
those indicia of consent are frustrated? For present purposes it would
not be necessary to decide that expectation rather than reliance (or reliance rather than expectation) should be the measure. But it would be
incongruous to say that both consideration and reliance vindicate consent but the damages for a contract based on one (reliance) are fluid in a
way that they are not if based on the other (consideration). In fact, if
both reliance and consideration support consent it may be that both
should support damages "as justice requires," a calculus reserved for

equity would not specifically enforce it.") (emphasis added); Carter v. Grossnickle, 11 Ohio N.P. (n.s.)
465, 1911 WL 864 at *8 (Com. Pl. 1911) ("The question is not whether the consideration of one dollar
is sufficient to sustain the deed, but whether that consideration is an adequate consideration to induce
or warrant a court of equity to decree specific performance.") (emphasis added).
156. Appendix, 4 A.L.I. PROC. 98-99 (1926).
157. In the Second Restatement, promissory estoppel is defined as
[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires.
RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90 (1981). The First Restatement version read:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932). For a discussion of the development of these sections, see
Yorio & Thel, supra note 50.
158. Appendix, A.L.I. PROC.l01-03 (1926).
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promissory estoppel cases. 159 Barnett does not appreciate that discontinuity and his consent theory may be mistaken, or at least incomplete,
therefore.
Barnett concludes in terms that seem to stretch extant Contract doctrine that "the absence of either bargained-for consideration or reliance
will not bar the enforcement of a transfer of entitlement that can be
proved in some way- for example, by a formal written document or by
adequate proof of a sufficiently unambiguous verbal commitment." 160
This might be the result of devising Contract in Barnett's consent terms,
but it is not Contract as we know it. It would fail to make sense of a
good deal of Contract doctrine. So, ultimately, to come to terms with
Barnett's theory of Contract, we must conclude that he is not so much
offering a construction of Contract as it is, a positive theory of Contract,
as he is proposing a vision of Contract as it would be were we to take his
consent theory as seriously as he would have us take it.
2.

Contract as Res

Peter Benson offers a more nuanced and, in its way, creative theory
of Contract to support the transfer heuristic he develops to make normative and positive sense of the law of enforceable promises. 161 While his
theory can tell a more convincing positive story of Contract, a coherent
normative theory still proves elusive. It is worthwhile first to consider
Benson's approach to Contract as a response to earlier theories. A discussion of the merits of his transfer heuristic follows.
a.

Responses to Reliance Theories

Benson's thesis is that we can understand Contract if we conceive of
Contract in terms of the transfer of a res at the time of Contract formation.162 He develops his theory in response to Fuller and Perdue's reliance theory which, recall, could not rationalize the expectation measure
of damages. 163 If the basis of Contract is reliance, as Fuller and Perdue
would have it, but the standard award to disappointed promisees is
measured by the expectation interest, then Contract is theoretically incoherent. So Fuller and Perdue explain Contract by concluding that, although the Contract doctrine refers to the recovery of expectation damages, a review of the cases reveals that the expectation measure is
nothing more than compensation for the frustrated reliance interest in
disguise. 164 While courts might think that they are providing the plaintiff
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Contra Barnett, supra note 12, at 317.
/d.
Peter Benson, Contract as a Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2007).
/d. at 1673-74.
See Fuller & Perdue, Contract Damager: 1, supra note 35, at 52- 53.
/d. at 61.
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the benefit of her bargain, in fact they are compensating the plaintiff on a
reliance basis but using the language of expectation to camouflage empirical uncertainties in determining the reliance measure. 165
Rather than take issue with Fuller and Perdue insofar as their reading of the cases is concerned, Benson finds in Contract doctrine support
for his conception of a contract's effecting an instantaneous and very
substantial transfer that is complete when there is agreement. 166 Each
party transfers to the other an immediate right immediately, so if there is
a breach, the nonbreaching party has been divested (not merely deprived) of something that she had at the instant of contracting, no matter
the executory nature of the "exchange. " 167 Now this conception of what
happens upon contracting is crucial insofar as it supports the award of
expectation damages in a way that Fuller and Perdue's application of
aretaic theory could not. 168 For Benson, the award of expectation damages does not give you something you never had; instead it compensates
you on account of something that has been taken from you: the right to
your counterparty's performance of her promise.
Crucial to Benson's theory is his equation of the transfer effected by
formation of a contract with "a present [physical] transfer of property." 169
Again, conceptions of consent are central: "First, the transfer must embody or express the decision of the initial owner to part with his or her
property." 170 In Benson's view, from the moment of contract formation
the promisee has an in personam right against the promisor that is every
bit as choate as the in rem right a transferee would have against her
transferor following physical delivery of the res. He concludes:
The promisee's so-called right to the promisor's performance reflects, then, a transfer of ownership at the moment of formation. It
is a right that is at once personal and proprietary in character. Indeed, its specific proprietary nature is inseparable from its being a
right in personam. Understood in this way, a right in personam is
no less proprietary than a right in rem. The fact that contract formation gives the promisee a right to performance does not, I conclude, make the logic of transfer inapplicable to contract. 171

165. The principal point of Fuller and Perdue's second installment is that "the contractual reliance interest receives a much wider {though often covert) recognition in the decisions than it does in
the textbooks." Fuller & Perdue, Contract Damages: 2, supra note 35. at 418.
166. Benson, supra note 161 , at 1722.
167. /d.; Benson, supra note 12, at 137.
168. Benson concludes:
If we must suppose that contract formation consists in a transfer of entitlement from one party to
the other-as is necessary if the expectation principle is to function as a principle of compensation- the .. . analysis of a transfer of ownership in the case of an executed conveyance of property should also apply to contract.
Benson, supra note 12, at 132.
169. /d. at 128.
170. /d.
171. /d. at 137.
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Benson's conception of what happens at the instance of contract formation-a real transfer with the consequences we associate with the transfer
of a physical res, that is, a transfer within the purview of property law
principles-supports his theory of Contract generally and informs his
understanding of Contract. His transfer heuristic, then, does a good deal
of both normative and positive heavy lifting. And because he is able to
use that heuristic to explain Contract law, particularly to overcome the
expectation damages problem that preoccupied Fuller and Perdue, Benson's theory is able to make sense of Contract where those who endorsed
promise and reliance theories could not. Benson accomplishes this by
specifying "a conception of entitlement for contract that is suitably transactional and complete at the moment of the parties' consents. " 172 This
provides Benson a perspective from which to appraise the promise and
reliance theories, and reveal their deficiencies.
The reliance theories fail because they do not appreciate that damage to the promisee's expectation interest is real: insofar as the promisee
received something of value at the instant of contract formation, breach
deprives the promisee of something she already had, not merely something she hoped to obtain. Benson engages Fried, Professor T.M. Scanlon, and Professor James Gordley and finds that each of those commentators' responses to Fuller and Perdue fail, where Benson's transfer
heuristic succeeds. 173
Fried fails, as far as Benson is concerned, because he shows only
"that the promisor's duty to perform is a duty of virtue, not a juridical
obligation of right." 174 Fried's perspective is Kantian, and so may be able
to provide a fairness basis supporting the disappointed promisee's right
to recover but, because it is not rights-based, lacks the means to vindicate
a particular measure of recovery, i.e. expectation rather than reliance. It
is one thing to find that the nonbreaching party has a right to recover as a
matter of fairness; it is wholly another to find some reason why that right
should be measured by expectation rather than reliance. Because Fried's
Kantian perspective cannot answer that more difficult measurement
question, it cannot respond to Fuller and Perdue in terms that support
the Contract law. Benson does not so much take issue with the moral
basis of Contract Fried provides as he does point out that Fried's moral
conception does not justify the expectation measure rather than the reliance measure Fuller and Perdue argue should attend breach. 175
According to Benson, Scanlon, 176 provides a moral argument in
support of enforcing promises but fails to provide the basis to support the

172. Benson, supra note 161, at 1680 (emphasis added).
173. Seeid. at 1681- 93.
174. /d. at 1682.
175. See id. at 1681-83.
176. T.M. Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CoNTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 86
(Peter Benson ed., 2001).
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expectation measure of damages. 177 Promisors and promisees would
want a means to provide "assurance" to one another that the promisor
will do what the promisor says he will do. 178 That is in the interest of
both parties. 179 Concomitantly, both are better off if the law provides a
means-beyond a fear of moral opprobrium-to motivate fulfillment of
promises. So both parties, Scanlon argues, have an interest in the law's
providing the sanctions to support the assurance. 180 That could not be
reasonably rejected by either promisor or promisee, and so has a moral
foundation. And, of course, it is easy enough for people to avoid legal
sanction for breach of contract: they can avoid entering into contracts or
breaching them once they have done so.
Again, Benson does not quibble with the moral basis of contracting
Scanlon posits as responsive to the Fuller and Perdue reservation. Benson simply does not believe Scanlon has found what he needed to find,
the basis of expectation rather than reliance damages:
The possibility of such a relation, which makes the thing assured
something that belongs in a juridical sense to the promisee just in
virtue of the promise and prior to the moment of performance, remains unexplained in this account. Failing to perform what has
been assured can quite reasonably and intelligibly be viewed as failing to confer a benefit which the promisee expects and upon which
he or she may rely. This does not, however, show that what is promised is acquired by and belongs to the promisee just on the basis of
the other party's promise, thus allowing breach to be viewed as an
interference with a present asset from which the promisee can by
rights exclude the promisor. 181
Thus Benson can find nothing in Scanlon's moral argument that responds
to the deficiency in Fuller and Perdue's conclusion and so nothing that
can save Contract, insofar as vindication of the expectation interest by
the award of expectation damages defines Contract.
Gordley 182 too, in Benson's estimation, fails to respond to Fuller and
Perdue in the terms Benson deems necessary. 183 Gordley's response to
Fuller and Perdue is based, first, on the Aristotelian virtue of liberality,
giving "to the right people the right amounts and at the right time." 184
Benson is not convinced:
This requires evaluating and weighing the motives, purposes, and
relevant circumstances of the donor, the needs and moral worthi177. Benson, supra note 161 , at 1683--88.
178. ld. at 1684.
179. Eric Posner analyzes this idea in the context of charitable gifts in Altruism, Status and Trust
in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567.
180. Cf HUME, supra note 5, at 314-15 (arguing that promises are only enforceable because society enforces them).
181. Benson, supra note 161 , at 1687.
182. Gordley, supra note 57.
183. Benson here responds to Gordley, supra note 57.
184. Benson, supra note 161, at 1690 (quoting Gordley, supra note 57, at 297).
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ness of the donee, presumably the value and the ethical significance
of alternative uses of the benefit including the legitimate interests
and needs of third parties, and so forth. The aim of this exercise is
to determine whether and to what extent a given promise qualifies
at a given point in time as an act of liberality. 185
Benson concludes that there is nothing in the idea of an act of liberality
that forecloses the promisor's changing his mind some time between
promise and promised act. Further, liberality does not entail a bilateral
relationship of promisor and promisee. Liberality "specifies a state of
inward moral character that is expressed in external acts. " 186 Liberality
does not involve relation to another, as Contract does.
Benson then turns to Gordley's apologia 181 for Contract in terms of
commutative justice, which necessarily contemplates a relational structure.188 The object of commutative justice, as a virtue, is to assure equality in bilateral transactions: "The parties to [contracts of exchange] exercise the virtue of commutative justice by exchanging resources that are
equivalent in value. " 189 So if the expectation measure of damages effects
commutative justice, Gordley-through Aristotle-will have discovered
the normative and positive foundations for Contract that Fuller and
Perdue missed. But Benson is not sanguine.
If commutative justice focuses on equality of exchange, it must
come to terms with the res exchanged in order to do the justice calculus.
That is, by focusing on exchange equivalence, Gordley ignores the predicate issue: What has been exchanged at the time of contract formation
which must be compensated for in the event of breach? Benson puts the
problem in terms of the relationship between promise and performance:
In Gordley's discussion, the intelligibility of promise as a mode of
transferring rights remains unexplained from the standpoints of
both commutative justice and liberality. Although promises may instantiate, be consistent with, or instrumentally further liberality and
commutative justice, these virtues are specified and justified independently of any analysis showing how promises can be understood
as rights-acquiring or rights-alienating acts and therefore how the
parties' voluntary interaction can constitute a transfer of rights between them. 190
Benson believes that Gordley must demonstrate how the promise can effect a transfer of rights from promisor to promisee in order for commutative justice to be of much help. Otherwise the ball just is not advanced;
commutative justice is merely a means to rephrase the enigma, not to
overcome it.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

/d.
/d. at 1691 (emphasis added).
/d.

See id.
Gordley, supra note 57, at 307.
Benson, supra note 161 , at 1692.
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Benson's critique of the reliance and promise theories is quite valuable. He exposes what is lacking in the dominant phases of Contract
theory and points out quite clearly where the gap is between extant theories and Contract doctrine focused, as it is, on expectation damages as
compensatory. Benson recognizes what is at stake: the very reason for
enforcing promises the way our legal system does so. 191 To appreciate
the cogency of Benson's critique is to appreciate the theoretical infirmity
of Contract, conceptualized in promise and reliance terms. But that appreciation comes at great cost: If Benson's transfer theory is not able to
fill the gap his critique exposes, Contract would remain theoretically incoherent unless we are prepared to accept that incoherence (in some
way) is a sufficient theory on its own.
b. Benson's Transfer Theory of Contract
For Benson's theory of Contract to work it must rationalize Contract doctrine, else it could be no more than a theory such as Barnett's,
which describes what Contract would be in Barnett's perfect world but
which diverges from Contract reality so substantially that it cannot help
us understand Contract as it is, either as a positive or normative matter.
Benson recognizes the challenge his "theory" must meet in order to be a
viable theory (without the quotation marks).192 And so his argument
turns to fundamental Contract doctrine and offers an explanation therefor in terms of his transfer heuristic. Benson focuses on offer and acceptance, consideration, and unconscionability. 193 If he can read those doctrines in a manner consistent with his transfer theory, he has advanced
the inquiry. For present purposes, it suffices to engage Benson's conclusions about Contract formation. 194
On the subject of offer and acceptance, Benson begins by recognizing the objective nature of the assent required for offer and acceptance, 195
and that an offer may be revoked until it has been accepted because it is
not until acceptance that the transfer effected by agreement has been ac-

191. See id. at 1674.
192. "(W]e treat the doctrines [of Contract law] just as provisionally fixed points for working out
a conception of contract and we begin with them because no better or more natural starting point offers itself for the purposes of a public basis of justification." Benson, supra note 12, at 138. By "public
justification," Benson means "the mode of justification and reasoning that is appropriate to settle the
fair terms ... of interaction and cooperation among persons." /d. at 124 n .12.
193. It would seem that Benson would also have to reconcile the generally substitutional rather
than specific nature of Contract damages too, but he has not done that, yet. He has, though, acknowledged that "complete argument for this claim requires that we show how all the significant doctrines
and principles of contract law fit within this conception." Benson, supra note 161, at 1731 n.90. My
reaction to Benson does not focus on the doctrines he has not yet chosen to explain; it confronts the
conclusions he has reached in the exegesis he has offered so far.
194. Treatment of Benson's approach to the unconscionability doctrine must be left for another
day, though nothing he says about unconscionability undermines the analysis and conclusions here.
195. "(T]he reasonably construed expression of assent in and of itself, not the thought process
that produced it, is the operative factor in formation." Benson, supra note 12, at 139.
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complished. 196 Benson makes much of the absolute revocability of an offer prior to acceptance:
The impact of performance on the well-being of the parties is, in itself, wholly irrelevant to the question of formation. This indifference to particular interest and advantage as such is reflected in the
(contractually) unfettered liberty of a party to revoke an offer before it is accepted or to decline, for whatever reason, to make an offer in the first place, irrespective of the impact which such decisions
may have on the other party's well-being. In and of itself, the fact
that my interests or welfare will be adversely affected by your decision does not give me a claim-or even the beginning of a claim-in
contract against you. 197
Now it is difficult to make perfect sense of what Benson means by the
limiting parenthetical, "contractually," or by the final "in contract."
Does he mean to exclude from his sweeping conclusion the operation of
rules such as those formulated in sections 45 198 and 87 199 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts? Section 45 describes when an option contract, essentially an irrevocable offer, will arise to avoid the hardship of
the so-called unilateral contract "trick." Because of Section 45, I cannot
offer to pay you $500 if you cross (actually cross, not merely promise to
do so) the Brooklyn Bridge and then attempt to withdraw my offer just
before you complete the trek. In fact, though, I have only consented to
be liable to you for the $500 if you complete the crossing, but the law (if
not the Contract law then what? 200) provides that you may bind me beyond the limits of my express consent and seems to do so on account of
the fact that your "interests or welfare [would] be adversely affected"
were I permitted to withdraw the offer after you have begun "the invited
performance. "201
It is true, of course, that the result accomplished by section 45 is
subject to the parties' manifestation of a contrary intention.202 But that
alone would not seem to respond to what may be a gap in Benson's argument. He does not acknowledge the limits of his absolute consent rule
in terms that are considerate of section 45. While he recognizes that the
absoluteness of the consensual offer and acceptance rule is qualified by

196. "[T]here is in law a liberty to revoke an as yet unaccepted offer." /d. at 140.
197. /d. at 143.
198. " Where an offer invites an offeree to accept by rendering a performance and does not invite
a promissory acceptance, an option contract is created when the offeree tenders or begins the invited
performance or tenders a beginning of it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 45(1) (1981).
199. "An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice." /d. § 87(2).
200. Indeed, the title of Section 45 is "Option Contract Created by Part Performance or Tender"
(emphasis added).
201. Benson, supra note 12, at 143.
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45, cmt. b (1981) ("The rule of this Section . . .
yields to a manifestation of intention which makes reliance unjustified.").
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deal-policing mechanisms, 203 he emphasizes that the offer and acceptance
rule assures that an agreement that may be voidable is not void ab initio:
[S]o far as offer and acceptance goes, the voluntary acts necessary
for contract formation can exist even where an agreement is voidable. And that is precisely why, so long as there are offer and acceptance, the parties can decide to affirm their agreement even in
the face of mistake or unwanted circumstances. 204
But the rule of section 45 turns that presumption of enforceability
around: the only way to assure that my consent to be bound is by your
actual performance, rather than your mere initiation of performance, is
to reserve a power to revoke after performance has begun. Were section
45 consistent with Benson's conception of the role of consent in Contract, the rule of the provision would be just the opposite: a presumption
that complete performance is required to enforce promise. But section
45 imposes liability beyond the parties' consent in order to take into account the promisee's "interests or welfare."205 The comments explain
that the section "is designed to protect the offeree in justifiable reliance
on the offeror's promise." 206 It is difficult to reach any other conclusion
about the intended operation and effect of the provision. This also foreshadows a likelihood that any theory of Contract that ignores justifiable
reliance must be incomplete, and it is difficult to find much reliance in
Benson's transfer theory.
Similarly, Restatement section 87 essentially elaborates on the rule
of section 45 and extends it to the situation where there has not been part
performance, where there has been no more than an offer which Benson's theory would need to deem revocable. So long as the offeror is
aware that her offer "should reasonably ... induce action or forbearance
of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance
and [the offer] does induce such action or forbearance" the offer "is
binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice. " 207
Now Benson could probably respond to the first challenge section
87 presents in the same way he might to section 45: the two provisions
are in fact the ostensible exceptions to the consent requirement that
prove the rule. The two provisions reverse the normal irrevocability rule
just in case the offeror should be understood to have consented to the
very "deal" the provisions impose on him. The reason why the provisions impose that rule does not matter so much as the predicate to their
doing so: the offeror in fact consents to the irrevocability of the offer because by making the offer in that particular way she consents to the irrevocability of the offer. The consent foundation remains unscathed.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Benson, supra note 12, at 142 n.32 .
ld. at 142.
ld. at 143.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS §

ld. § 87(2) (emphasis added).

45, cmt. b (1981).
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The first problem with that response would be that once consent
can be so constructed post hoc, it loses a good deal of its theoretical
force. That is, consent becomes a conclusion rather than an analytical
tool. Consent so construed means no more than what Benson wants to
avoid its meaning: the basis to impose Contract liability on general fairness grounds.208 But Benson's theory requires that "contract formation
[be], by its very nature, independent of whether transactions are to the
overall advantage or benefit of one or even both of the parties." 209 Sections 45 and 87 make clear that Contract law, at the offer and acceptance
formation stage on which Benson's analysis focuses, is very much concerned with "overall advantage or benefit ... of the parties. " 210
Second, while the entire object of Benson's consent-based transfer
analysis is to save Contract law from the corner into which Fuller and
Perdue's reliance theory painted it, section 87's damage measure undermines expectation. If we can find the requisite consent even when we
impose a result to take account of the "overall advantage or benefit ... of the parties" then you would think that such consent would entail
Contract law's expectation consequences. 211 But section 87 abjures the
expectation measure insofar as it provides that the offer is binding "to
the extent necessary to avoid injustice. " 212
Third, and finally, it is disingenuous to parse the Contract doctrine
as Benson would have us do to discover a role for consent that is just not
there in the way Benson suggests that it is. Contract doctrine is not just
the simple offer and acceptance formation rules unadorned by corollaries
such as sections 45 and 87. To have a comprehensive theory of Contract
we need to account for the rules as well as the refinements to the rules
that apply to particular cases. If Benson's theory cannot do that, he
really has not taken us much further than Fried did, offering a partial explanation of some of Contract doctrine while ignoring the fuller fabric of
the object of our study.
Benson also recognizes the central role that consideration plays in
the Contract doctrine and in his discussion of consideration encounters
again, but again does not acknowledge, the clash between consideration
and premises Benson would consider more distributive in nature: "The
consideration must be given in response to the promisor's request and as
quid pro quo for the promise. It is not enough that the promisee's act or
promise is reasonably foreseeable to the promisor. "213 Of course it is
208. Benson, supra note 161, at 1680.
209. Benson, supra note 12, at 143. Benson concludes that "[t)he doctrine of offer and acceptance
seems at its core to be indifferent to the very kinds of considerations that centrally concern distributive
justice." /d. Benson does address, obliquely, the "idea of estoppel," but his treatment of the doctrine
does not clarify how he would respond to the challenge presented by sections 45 and 87. See id. at 146
n.35.
210. /d. at 143.
211. /d.
212. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS§ 87 (1981).
213. Benson, supra note 161, at 1713 (emphasis added).
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enough that "the promisee's decision ... is reasonably foreseeable to the
promisor. " 214 That is the sum and substance of the promissory estoppeF 15
basis of promise enforcement, which may be indistinguishable from the
consideration basis of promise enforcement.
Benson anticipates that objection and responds in terms that attempt to distinguish promise- from reliance-based liability, but does so in
a way that may undermine defense of his consent-based transfer theory:
The fact that in reliance-based liability the inducement and reliance must be temporally successive but cannot also be simultaneous means that such liability is incompatible with an essential premise of the logic of a transfer of ownership. It cannot possibly satisfy
the requirement of continuity. Accordingly, it is impossible to conceive the one who relies as acquiring an entitlement to the thing
promised or represented . ... Thus, there can be no intrinsic connection between reliance-based liability and the expectation principle,
taken as a principle of compensation. 216
What Benson seems to miss here is the fact that a court finding the bases
of Restatement section 90217 promissory estoppel liability is not constrained to award the disappointed promisee no more than reliance damages.218
The promisee may recover what "justice requires," 219 including, we
may assume, expectation damages. So if Benson has discovered the
means to vindicate the award of expectation damages in promise-based
consideration cases, he has undermined the award of expectation damages in reliance-based cases. That is, there is nothing endemic to promise-based cases that supports expectation damages; reliance-based liability may just as well support expectation damages. And because Benson
makes clear that reliance-based liability is not premised on transfer, 220
there is nothing about expectation recovery that requires transfer, or
even, it would follow, the consent component of his transfer thesis. So in
the course of trying to reconcile the alternative basis of Contract liability,

214. /d.
215. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981). Benson acknowledges that
"[w]hat is often referred to as 'promissory estoppel' has all the markings of the principle of detrimental reliance applied in a contractual setting." Benson, supra note 12, at 176.
216. Benson, supra note 12, at 175.
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90 (1981).
218. See, e.g., Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 463-64 (7th Cir. 1986) (advocating a "value
of the promise" approach to damages in a promissory estoppel setting); Chedd-Angier Prod. Co., Inc.
v. Omni Publ'n Int'l, Ltd., 756 F.2d 930, 936-37 (1st Cir. 1985) (applying section 90 of the restatement
to affirm the lower court's award of "full contract damages"); Daigle Commercial Group, Inc. v. St.
Laurent, 734 A.2d 667, 674-75 (Me. 1999) ('"A promise binding under [promissory estoppel] is a contract, and full-scale enforcement by normal remedies is often appropriate."') (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90 cmt. d (1981) (alteration in original)).
219. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) (1981).
220. Benson notes that "(r]eliance-based analysis cannot view the promise or representation as
one side of a transfer of rights between the parties." Benson, supra note 12, at 175.
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promissory estoppel, with his consent-based transfer theory, Benson
compromises his thesis, profoundly.221
Benson also points to the preexisting duty rule as further support
for his transfer thesis because the "rule requires that an act or promise
given by a promisee as consideration must not have been already provided as consideration in a prior binding agreement between the parties."222 He concludes that "[t]he rule reflects a conception of contract as
a transfer of right."223 Indeed, the rule might well fit Benson's thesis if
our interest and endeavor were only to make sense of the rule in its classic form rather than as elaborated in the doctrine. Contract law recognizes sufficient exceptions224 to the preexisting duty rule to put into question any. description of doctrine that would need to ignore them in order
to maintain internal integrity.
The foregoing description of Benson's transfer theory, both as the
basis of a critique of the reliance theories and an interpretive theory in its
own right, is sufficient to demonstrate the boxes into which the extant
theories would put Contract, and how they would do so. 225 My reactions
to Benson and the others reveals my disquiet with such theoretical efforts. I do not believe that Contract will reduce to the terms that any of
the extant theories provide. Before elaborating on the conclusion that
flows from that realization, it is necessary to appreciate another aspect
which the theoretical confusion engendered by transfer theory reveals. If

221. It should be clear that Benson's argument is similarly compromised to the extent that we can
discover promise-based liability in which a measure of recovery other than expectation is awarded.
That would, for example, include Paola Gas Co. v. Paola Glass Co., 44 P. 621 (Kan. 1896) and Griffin
v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489 (N.Y. 1858), which Fuller and Perdue cite as illustrating the difficulty in calculating damages in cases where the defendant's breach results in the plaintiffs property remaining idle.
While the former case found damages in the plaintiffs lost use of his property (a reliance calculation),
the latter found the appropriate measure to be the loss of profits which would have been made had the
defendant performed his promise (an expectation calculation). See Fuller & Perdue, Contract Damages: 1, supra note 35, at 75.
222. Benson, supra note 12, at 177; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 73 (1981)
("Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest
dispute is not consideration .... ").
223. Benson, supra note 12, at 179.
224. These include a novation, the receipt of additional consideration, changed or unforeseen
circumstances, and invocation of statutes such as U.C.C. § 2-209, which permit modification without
additional consideration. U.C.C. § 2-209 (2003). Additionally, contracting parties may circumvent the
rule's application by simply agreeing to do so. FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, §§ 4.21-.22.
225. I have not here treated Benson's conceptualization of the unconscionability doctrine in
terms that would confirm his consent-based transfer theory. Suffice it so say that Benson needs to find
(and so finds) that unconscionability may be articulated "in terms of the parties' presumed intentions."
Benson, supra note 12, at 187. While a thoughtful response to his argument would require more than
marginal treatment, the pithy response would suggest, once again, that he may have to distort the doctrine (or, at least present it less than completely) in order to formulate it in terms that support his
analysis. For Benson, unconscionability is about equivalence of exchange; certainly equivalence matters, but there is just more to it.
U.C.C. § 2A-108, for example, permits courts to avoid as unconscionable contracts to which consumers are party wholly on procedural rather than substantive grounds. Also, in order to most coherently appreciate the role of unconscionability, it may be necessary to more fully engage the operation
of the other deal policing mechanisms, most notably impracticability, frustration , and mistake.
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Contract may be understood by reference to the transfer heuristic,
should not operation of the Contract and property doctrine lead ineluctably to the same results?

II. THE CLASH OF CONTRACT AND PROPERTY
In The Morality of Property,226 Professors Thomas Merrill and
Henry Smith find a persistent moral thread that runs through and unifies
property law, a thread that cannot be explained in consequentialist
terms. They conclude that a deep but perhaps not wholly accessible deontology explains both our reactions to recurring controversies involving
property contests as well as the courts' (and legislatures') responses to
property disputes.227 Whether their conclusions, even as a positive matter, are or are not assailable, for present purposes it suffices to understand their project as an effort to formulate what fundamental deontological premises support familiar property law concepts. It is necessary
to describe the general parameters of their argument in order to appreciate its contribution to the object of this article: to discover the possibility
of a theoretical basis for Contract.228
Merrill and Smith observe that it would be unlikely for legal protection of property to be out of step with what they describe as "common
morality."229 So it would be unlikely that we would encounter property
law that conflicts with such common moral conceptions. From that we
may infer that property law,230 properly understood, would reflect common morality. 231 Thus we could discover that common morality by surveying the decisions and statutes that resolve property contests. 232

226. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1849 (2007).
227. /d. at 1855-57,1870-90,1894-95.
228. And this possibility, keep in mind, is framed in terms of the success of the extant theories.
229. Merrill & Smith, supra note 226, at 1854.
230. Alllaw?
231. Though it is curious that at the outset of their article , the authors say that "[a]n institution
assumed to be wholly dependent on law for its existence is unlikely to be infused with strong moral
content." Merrill & Smith, supra note 226, at 1849. There seems to be some tension between the two
statements. If law is understood as serving certain coordination, expertise, and efficiency functions,
see LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULES OF RULES 232 n.4 {2001), then there is no
reason to believe that the fact of an institution's dependence on law could not "be infused with strong
moral content." The morality may just be latent, which, of course, is a matter of perspective.
232. A corollary of Merrill and Smith's proposition is that "when legal protection of property is
out of sync with common morality, we often see widespread disregard of legally recognized property
rights." Merrill & Smith, supra note 226, at 1854. They offer downloading of copyrighted material
from the web as an example of this. /d. They could certainly also have used photocopying of music
without payment to composers as another example of the same phenomenon. While it is not clear that
downloading and such photocopying reveals morality-it may rather reveal more about ignorance of
copyright laws-what matters is their point that Jaw is impotent to overcome the common morality, at
least over time. If they are correct then we may discover a common morality by reviewing the law in
practice and be sure that that common morality is venerable. They may also be only partially correct
(common morality may only resist without actually defying law) and their point would still be an important one, insofar as it tells us where to look for the morality of law.
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The authors also conclude that "[w]hatever their source, property
rules and the moral rules that support them must be simple and general,
at least as to the core of property."233 But that simplicity is not so much a
function of the morality as it is a limitation imposed on the morality by
human intellectual, perspectival, and, perhaps, perceptual capacities. For
a morality to be "common" it must be accessible.234 You get the sense
that for Merrill and Smith, there is almost something visceral about the
relative inviolability of property vouchsafed by the common morality,
something on the same order as "possession is nine tenths of the law," or
"a man is the king of his castle."
It would even seem that the common morality Merrill and Smith
discover would withstand convincing consequentialist argument to the
contrary; certain moral rights are "sticky." While we might acknowledge
some system whereby polluters can pay for a right to pollute, "[a] right to
pollute sounds morally offensive, in part because our default entitlements track moral rules under which causation is not reciprocal. " 235 And
that mindset would obtain even when it is made clear to the common
citizen that there would, in fact, be less pollution were we to imagine and
provide for the "right to pollute."
Merrill and Smith's conclusion, or at least the operating principle
that animates their study, is that "property is critically dependent on
simple moral intuitions about the importance of protecting possession
against unwanted invasions. " 236 That is, indeed, quite simple, but they
provide illustrations to support the conclusion. They offer first the case
of Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 237 in which the Wisconsin Supreme
Court upheld an award of $100,000 in exemplary damages on account of
a trespass that resulted in no physical harm whatsoever to the plaintiffs'

233. ld. at 1857.
234. The proposed futures market in terrorism, funded by the Pentagon "in the belief that it
might help predict the probability of future terrorist attacks," certainly did not achieve a common
moral acceptance. Peter Wayner, Predict the Future? You Can Bet on It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2003 at
G5. However, the market's lack of acceptance seems to derive more from a failure of public relations
and education than from a common moral objection. See id. Thus, it is not immediately clear why
morality must be generally accessible in order to be a common morality. The true moral foundation of
an institution may be latent or opaque, at least so far as the masses are concerned. There would not
seem to be anything in moral theory that requires a normative explanation to be patently obvious. Cf.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 226, at 1851 ("[T]he type of morality that will support a system of property rights must be suitable for all members of the community.") Again, though, Merrill and Smith's
normative conclusions, for present purposes, need not depend on their accessibility conclusions.
235. Merrill & Smith, supra note 226, at 1865. The causation is "not reciprocal" in the sense that
we do not think of both the polluter and the victims of the pollution as being, together, causes of the
pollution problem. Merrill and Smith are responding here to an economic perspective "under which
the polluter has the 'entitlement to pollute' that the resident can take upon payment of the polluter's
cost of abatement or shutting down." ld. (citing Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1116
(1972)). For a similar economic perspective, see R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960).
236. Merrill & Smith, supra note 226, at 1866.
237. 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
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real property. 238 The Jacques were, in fact, wholly unreasonable when
they denied the brief access to their property that the defendant requested.239 But the court does not care: The Jacques are entitled to their
unreasonable beliefs no matter how inefficient their decision to exclude
the defendant might be.240 The court cares only about the deontology,
not the consequences, as the portion of the opinion Merrill and Smith
reproduce reflects: "(W]hat is to stop (defendant] from concluding, in the
future, that delivering its mobile homes via an intentional trespass and
paying the resulting Class B forfeiture, is not more profitable than obeying the law?"241 The common morality of property law, then, as revealed
in Jacque, champions a visceral sense of rights over consequences.
Now you might think that the normative significance of Jacque
would be undermined by cases that seem less indulgent of the rights to
possession for the right to possession's sake. Consider the recent United
States Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London,242 in
which the Court recognizes a city government's right to exercise the
power of eminent domain to promote economic development, to take
from private citizen A and give to private commercial entity B solely for
the sake of increasing the economic value of the property after the confiscation.243 The law, after all, supported the very taking that Merrill and
Smith argue is inconsistent with the common morality of property law.
But the Court's conclusion in Kelo is not so much the story as is the
public response to the decision, at least so far as formulating the common
morality of property is concerned:
Kelo elicited unprecedented public opposition to the idea of takings
of private property for economic development. This public backlash, when translated into the actions of legislators, local public officials, and state and lower federal courts, will probably have a
greater impact on the future use of eminent domain than the
Court's decision in Kelo. Certainly for our purposes, we can take
the anti-Kelo position to be a more accurate statement of general
sentiment about property rights than the opposition position.244
Notwithstanding "the perfectly plausible utilitarian case"245 for the taking
in Kelo, Merrill and Smith discern an overwhelming public resistance to
such action: "The basic moral intuition is the same as that which says [as
in Jacque] intentional trespass or theft is wrong."246 "Coercion of the innocent"247 is just wrong, full stop. While there may be perfectly plausible
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Jd. at 166.
See id. at 157.
See id. at 160.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 226, at 1873 (quoting Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 161).
545 u.s. 469 (2005).
/d. at 477.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 226, at 1880.
/d. at 1882.
Jd.

/d. at 1883.
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consequentialist arguments supporting the Kelo taking and the Jacque
trespass, costs outweighed by benefits, the public will have none of it and
so the moral dimension of the property law rejects it out of hand. Merrill
and Smith conclude as well that the property law's general impatience
with bad faith actions reflects this same moral conclusion.248 There is an
immanent normative foundation of the property law that is reflected in
Jacque, proscription of bad faith behavior, and the public outcry following Kelo.
Though it may be that some could take issue with Merrill and
Smith's conclusion about the venerability of the moral foundation they
describe,249 for present purposes we need only agree that Merrill and
Smith tell a plausible story about the morality of property, a story that is
certainly not out of line with popular perceptions and that resonates with
the property law as they describe it. The challenge for Contract theory,
particularly Contract theory based on the transfer heuristic, would be to
demonstrate consonance between the property rules and the analogous
Contract rules. That is, if Benson and Barnett as champions of the transfer theory are going to be able to explain Contract as a transfer of an existing res, then we would expect that the result in Contracts and property
controversies would align. But that is just not the case.
Superimpose Contract over the relationship between the parties in
Jacque: Imagine that the Jacques and the defendant had entered into a
contract pursuant to which the Jacques promised to pay the defendant
$50 in return for the defendant's promise not to take a certain path
across the Jacques' property for the next month. (For present purposes
it does not matter what precontract right, if any, the Jacques had to restrict the defendant's access to the property.250) So we have a contractbased exchange of promises: in exchange for A's agreement not to do X,
B
pay A $50. If B pays A the $50, then the contract is partly executed but the promise of A, not to cross the property at the designated
point, is executory, and will not be fully executed until the month lapses.
(Of course, A and B may instead agree that B will not pay A the $50 until
the end of the month; the order of their performance does not matter.)
In the event A crosses B's property before the end of the designated
month, A will be liable to B in an amount equal to B's expectation interest: the amount necessary to provide B the benefit of her bargain with A.
If a court finds that the value of that expectancy is $50, then B will be

will

248. Merrill and Smith point to "trespasses, bad faith adverse possession, takings for economic
development, and nonviolent property crimes." /d. at 1894. For an argument that the Contract law is
similarly intolerant of bad faith behavior, see David Morris Phillips, The Commercial Culpability Scale,
92 YALE L.J. 228 (1982) (arguing that a scale of scienter explains the U.C.C.'s allocation of risk of
Joss).
249. Price controls at one time seemed to make sense, until we learned that they resulted in more
rather than less consumer hardship.
250. It could, for example, be the case that the Jacques had already rented a portion of their
property to the defendant and then agreed to refund $50 of that rental in order to keep the defendant
from crossing a particular portion of the property.
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able to recover the $50 from A. But if the court determines that the
value of the expectancy is only $25, B will recover only $25. Similarly, if
the value of the expectancy is $100, B will recover $100. There is nothing
talismanic about the $50, though it may provide the court evidence of the
value of the expectancy.
But we need not focus on the hypothetical in order to demonstrate
the divergence between the property morality revealed by Jacque and
Contract "morality." The collision is made manifest by the analysis and
result in two venerable pillars of Contracts case law: Jacob & Youngs v.
Kenf51 and Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. 252 The facts of
each case are familiar to students of Contract law and the conclusions
reached by each court reflect the prevailing Contract doctrine. 253
In Jacob & Youngs, the plaintiff agreed to build a residence for the
defendant, but failed to use the brand of pipe, "Reading," specified in
the contract. 254 When the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for the balance of the price under the construction contract, the defendant resisted, arguing that because the plaintiff's tender had not been
perfect, the defendant was not obligated to pay for the structure as completed.255 In his opinion, Judge Cardozo refuses to find a sufficient failure of condition to relieve defendant of his obligation to pay. 256 All the
judge can find was a breach of promise. The difference between the two,
condition and promise, determines the result. While a failure of condition would result in a forfeiture-plaintiff would recover nothing from
defendant-mere breach of promise results only in damage liability. Insofar as the replacement of Reading pipe with the alternative but not inferior product did not impair the value of the finished building, the defendant could resist the plaintiff's payment demand. 257
Judge Cardozo casts his opinion in terms that resonate with the kind
of common morality Merrill and Smith found in Jacque:
Considerations partly of justice and partly of presumable intention
are to tell us whether this or that promise shall be placed in one
class or in another [promise or condition] .... There will be harshness sometimes and oppression in the implication of a condition
when the thing upon which labor had been expended is incapable of
surrender ... and equity and reason in the implication of a like
condition when the subject-matter, if defective, is in shape to be returned. From the conclusion that promises may not be treated as
dependent to the extent of their uttermost minutiae without a sacri251. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
252. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1963).
253. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 229 (1981) ("To the extent that the nonoccurrence of a condition would cause disproportionate forfeiture, a court may excuse the nonoccurrence of that condition unless its occurrence was a material part of the agreed exchange.").
254. Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 890.
255. /d.
256. /d. at 891.
257. /d. at 890.
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fice of justice, the progress is a short one to the conclusion that they
may not be so treated without a perversion of intention. Intention
not otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold in contemplation
the reasonable and probable ....
Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the development of legal rules than of practical adaptation to the attainment of
a just result will be troubled by a classification where the lines of
division are so wavering and blurred.... The courts have balanced
such consideration against those of equity and fairness, and found
the latter to be the weightier. 258
Cardozo's language is the language of common morality, at least insofar
as that conception has traction for Merrill and Smith.
It is clear from the Jacob & Youngs opinion that the defendant had,
indeed, specified Reading Pipe. 259 So it would not be correct to conclude
that Cardozo's conclusion turns on the defendant's failure to sufficiently
specify the goods he had in mind. All that may have been missing was,
perhaps, the defendant's stating "and I mean it" after insisting on Reading Pipe in the contract. 260 No, the reason Cardozo found breach of
promise rather than failure of condition was to avoid a forfeiture, to do
some equity. The conscientious student of that portion of the Contract
law concerning the distinction between promises and conditions261 will
recognize that in the characterization issue there is room for a court to do
equity, and that equitable calculus owes nothing to a transfer analysis.
We can reach a similar conclusion when we consider another venerable pillar of Contracts jurisprudence that confronts a forfeiture-like
question: May the nonbreaching party recover damages measured by
cost of repair if that amount would greatly exceed damages measured by
the value of the defendant's performance? The issue is a familiar one,
and perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in Peevyhouse v. Garland
Coal & Mining Co. 262
In Peevyhouse, the defendant mining company entered into a contract with the plaintiff pursuant to which the defendant was to have the
right to extract minerals from the plaintiff's land in exchange for the
payment of a royalty and for defendant's promise to restore plaintiff's
property to its pre-extraction condition at the end of the lease term. 263
The estimated cost of restoration was $29,000 but restoration would result in only a $300 increase in the value of the property. 264 The court refused to order restoration: "[W]here the economic benefit which would
258.
259.
260.
fectuate
261.

/d. at 890-91.
See id. at 890.
See id. at 891 ("This is not to say that the parties are not free by apt and certain words to efa purpose that performance of every term shall be a condition of recovery.").
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 224-230 (1981); Richard Lord, 3
WILLISTON ON CONTRACfS § 7:18 (4th ed. 2004).
262. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
263. /d. at 111.
264. /d. at 112.
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result to lessor by full performance of the work is grossly disproportionate to the cost of performance, the damages which lessor may recover are
limited to the diminution in value resulting to the premises because of
the non-performance. " 265 The apposite Restatement (Second) provision
formulates that rule. 266
Now there may be good reasons why a lessor would want lease
property restored to its prelease condition upon termination of the lease
term, 267 just as there may be good reasons why someone might want
Reading pipe when another brand of pipe would do just as well.268 It
does not matter to the point here that such good reasons might exist and
maybe had not been emphasized sufficiently by the nonbreaching party
or that those reasons as stated by the nonbreaching party had not convinced the court. All that matters for present purposes is the fact that
Jacob & Youngs and Peevyhouse undermine any equation between the
"transfer" of promises in those cases and the "transfer" policed by
Jacque.
In Jacque it did not matter that the Jacques were being unreasonable. The common morality of the property law vindicated just such unreasonableness. As Merrill and Smith explain, "[r]easonable persons
would have quickly agreed on a temporary license as a solution to the
problem; the Jacques were not reasonable persons. But the court obviously believed that did not matter; the question of comparative utilities
simply was irrelevant to the analysis." 269 By contrast, reasonableness
means everything in Jacob & Youngs and Peevyhouse. Reasonableness
is the measure of the promise's exchange.
So it is difficult to find room for Jacobs & Y oung!Peevyhouse and
Jacque in the same transfer paradigm. The morality of the rules is just
not reconcilable. If transfer explains one it does not explain the other.
What could that mean for Contract theory, and theorizing about what
theory can accomplish?
III. THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT THEORY
The object of theory must be to explain; theory must leave us with
more understanding, even if that just amounts to understanding in different terms. The promise, reliance, and transfer heuristics, were they viable, would provide us the means to appraise the coherence of Contract

265. /d. at 114.
266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 347, 348(2)(b) (1981) (setting the standard
measure of damages as loss in value and allowing for damages based on cost of completion only "if
that cost is not clearly disproportionate to the probable loss in value").
267. /d. § 347 cmt. b (reflecting that loss in value must sometimes be determined based on the
value of performance " to the injured party himself and not [its value] to some hypothetical reasonable
person or on some market").
268. /d.
269. Merrill & Smith, supra note 226, at 1872-73.
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doctrine. We could predict how doctrine might develop as transactional
patterns evolve and we could appraise applications of doctrine, both
statutory and common law. We would have a means to decide whether a
particular resolution was consistent with our theory of Contract, consistent with our sense of what it is Contract is designed to do. Without theory we would be somewhat adrift, lacking the moorings to support reliable judgments about the integrity of an instance of Contract law's
application.
When we reach a conclusion about Contract's coherence or integrity, we are necessarily deciding whether the one thing, here, Contract
doctrine, makes sense in terms of another, here our common moral conceptions. Because the result in Kelo departed from the common morality
of property Merrill and Smith had discovered in cases such as Jacque,
Merrill and Smith could explain the negative popular reaction to the
Kelo. That is, the law of Kelo did not make sense given the common morality of property, so something would have to give. Because you could
not make sense of Kelo in terms of the morality of property, one could
not be coherent in terms of the other. For Merrill and Smith what had to
give was the law of Kelo, and they describe legislative reactions to Keto
in just those terms. 270
Similarly, we could not coherently posit a normative theory of Contract if we cannot discover the Contract morality in Jacob & Youngs and
Peevyhouse. If Benson were correct and the contractual promise effects
a transfer akin to a transfer of property,271 then we would expect the result in Jacque to be consistent with the result in Jacob & Youngs and
Peevyhouse, but the case results are irreconcilable; the same moral sense
could not be informing the result in the cases. Jacob & Youngs and
Peevyhouse are incoherent in the moral terms of Jacque and the other
manifestations of property morality discovered by Merrill and Smith.
The foregoing, though, would only demonstrate that Benson's
property transfer heuristic cannot account for fundamental aspects of
Contract doctrine. It would not establish that Contract theory is necessarily incoherent by reference to any other measure. The other extant
heuristics-reliance and promise-though, do no better, and, as was
demonstrated above, cannot explain enough of Contract to stand as
theories of Contract. At best, they explain some Contract rules and results and mark the limits of what Contract theory can accomplish.
The question remains, though: Is there a latent theory, some way to
make sense of the one thing, Contract, in terms of the other, morality,
and do so in a way that will accomplish the prediction and explanation
tasks we would want theory to accomplish? There is room for skepticism.

270.
271.

/d. at 1880 & n.42.
See Benson, supra note 161, at 1725-31.
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An obstacle is the nature of heuristics generally. They are necessarily over- and under-inclusive, much like all rules. 272 A heuristic by its
very nature truncates information in the course of translating the terms
of the data (i.e. Contract law) into the heuristic (i.e. promise, reliance,
transfer). Heuristics are rules of thumb, designed to accommodate the
processing of data, and given the properties of heuristic reductiondiscrimination 273 and leverage274 - something gets lost "in the translation," as it were. All heuristics fail us from time to time, and that is no
less true of moraf75 heuristics than it is of perceptual276 or rational277 heuristics. So it is not surprising that no Contract heuristic-promise, reliance, or transfer-could be perfect. That is, it would be fair to describe
anomalous decisions as "wrong," a departure from the correct theory (after all, that is what Kelo was, Supreme Court decision or not).
We can reach one of two decisions when extant heuristics, theories
of Contract, fail: Either the theory is wrong (as promise concludes that
reliance is and as transfer concludes they both are) and we just have not
yet found the right theory or combination of theories, or, the more problematic alternative, there is something about Contract doctrine that resists such theory.
A response to the first possibility-that the right theory is out there
we have just not yet found it-has been offered by Professor Jody Kraus,
who would stack the deontological and consequentialist278 to find the
theory that works. 279 As I have demonstrated elsewhere,280 that approach does not so much solve the theoretical dilemma as shift the locus
of the question: Instead of asking whether deontology or consequentialism better explains Contract, we would ask which is more fundamental.
The answer remains the same-it depends-and is not particularly helpful.
Related to that first response may be the idea that there is nothing
about Contract, or any bundle of data, that must as a matter of metaphysical or physical imperative resolve into the something else that we
272. See Alces, On Discovering Doctrine, supra note 2, at 473.
273. " Discrimination refers to our ignoring portions of data that can be ignored without impairing
its message . .. (reducing the size of the data pattern to make it more manageable)." See id. at 505;
STEPHEN WOLFRAM, A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE 549 (2002).
274. "Leverage" refers to our ability (or propensity) to focus on regularities without becoming
distracted by the particulars that are not pertinent to the perceptual or analytical exercise. See Alces,
On Discovering Doctrine, supra note 2, at 505; WOLFRAM, supra note 273, at 549-52.
275. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (2000); Cass R. Sunstein,
Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556 (2004).
276. See generally HOWARD MARGOLIS, PARADIGMS & BARRIERS (1993) [hereinafter
MARGOLIS, PARADIGMS) ; HOWARD MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, THINKING, AND COGNITION (1987) (hereinafter MARGOLIS, PATTERNS].
277. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman eta!. eds., 1982).
278. The theoretical world see ms to nicely and necessarily devolve into that dichotomy.
279. Kra us, supra note 14, at 687.
280. Alces, supra note 3, at 1662-66.
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would have do the heuristic work. That is, there may just not be (at least,
yet) a theoretical (heuristic) construct that would do the work we want a
Contract theory to do. 281 There might even be something a tad arrogant
about our assuming that there must be such a construct or that it would
be accessible to us. 282 We may have, in other words, set for ourselves an
impossible object. That would not make the quest meaningless-we may
be able to learn some valuable things along the way- but it would be
frustrating, at least.
There is, though, a second response, not wholly unrelated to the ostensible near nihilism just suggested: Contract may be best understood as
an amalgam of normative inclinations, with pure deontology and pure
consequentialism as poles at the ends of a continuum. Further, the point
on that continuum occupied by a particular aspect of doctrine, or rule,
may be a function of the rule-fact dynamic. So conceived, a threedimensional structure emerges that may be contrasted with the twodimensional structure that, I submit, best describes the current effort to
match theory with doctrine.
That too would be consistent with and would in fact reveal something about the necessary plasticity of Contract doctrine. The reason efforts to impose a normative heuristic on Contract fail is not because the
normative heuristics are necessarily incoherent: We could certainly imagine a body of Contract law that tracks promise, reliance, or transfer conceptions. The problem, as demonstrated above,283 is that Contract is not
as simple as it would need to be for the heuristic to work as well as we
would need it to work, which is well enough to support normative conclusions.
The extent to which a heuristic "works" is, of course, a matter of
degree of acuity.284 Certainly Contract is more like a promise or a transfer of something than it is like an athletic event, jigsaw puzzle, or a crime.
The problem is that Contract is not enough like a promise or transfer to
enable us to make sufficient sense out of Contract in terms of promise or
transfer. The problem is one of fit, which is ultimately the problem confronting all heuristics.

281. Cf BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE: SUPERSTRINGS, HIDDEN DIMENSIONS, AND
TilE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE THEORY (First Vintage Books ed., Vintage Books 2000) (arguing that
the limits of the human imagination are the primary obstacle in formulating an ultimate theory of astronomical physics).
282. Perhaps the appropriate answer awaits the proper question. In one sense, then, "the Answer ... [i]s ... 42" -but we can't fathom the question. DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER'S
GUIDE TO THE GALAXY (First Ballantine Books ed. , The Ballantine Publishing Group 1980).
283. See supra Part I.
284. Perceptual discontinuity and idiosyncrasy invite the creation of generalized rules of thumb,
"which on the whole have led to good results but in certain situations lead to errors." MARGOLIS,
PAITERNS, supra note 276, at 13. For a physicist's perspective, see MURRAY GELL-MANN, THE
QUARK AND THE JAGUAR 29 (1994) ("[W)hen defining complexity it is always necessary to specify a
level of detail up to which the system is described, with finer details being ignored. Physicists call that
'coarse graining."').
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Exacerbating the problem is the very nature of Contract (and perhaps all legal) doctrine: It is not designed to track any particular normative perspective. Further, Contract is not just a mix of the deontologicaF85 and the consequentialist286 ; it is often- in fact, usually -cast in
terms that accommodate either perspective as well as subiterations
within both perspectives. 287 Because the dominant perspectives, deontology and consequentialism (and aretaic theory, too, for that matter), often

285. Much of the Second Restatement, for example, is cast in deontological terms. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS (1981). For example,§ 86, "Promise for Benefit Received"
("extent necessary to prevent injustice"); § 94, "Stipulations" ("if the modification is fair and equitable"; "to extent that justice requires enforcement"); § 139, "Enforcement by Virtue of Action in Reliance" ("The remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires.");§ 158, "Relief Including
Restitution" ("grant relief on such terms as justice requires");§ 173, " When Abuse of a Fiduciary Relation Makes a Contract Voidable" (contract voidable unless "it is on fair terms"); § 176, "When a
Threat is Improper" (" threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms");§ 184, " When
Rest of Agreement is Enforceable" ("reasonable standards of fair dealing"); § 190, "Promise Detrimental to Marital Relationship" ("fair in the circumstances");§ 195, "Term Exempting from Liability
for Harm Caused Intentionally, Recklessly or Negligently" (term unenforceable unless "fairly bargained for"); § 205, "Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing" (pervasive duty of "good faith and fair
dealing"); § 223, "Course of Dealing" ("fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding"); § 243, "Effect of a Breach by Non-Performance as Giving Rise to a Claim for Damages for
Total Breach" (such impairment of value of contract to injured party "that it is just in the circumstances to allow him to recover");§ 260, "Application of Payments Where Neither Party Exercises his
Power" ("just regard to the interests of third persons, the debtor and the creditor"); § 272, "Relief
Including Restitution" (if other apposite rules "will not avoid injustice, the court may grant relief on
such terms as justice requires"); § 351, "Unforeseeability and Related Limitations on Damages"
("court may limit damages ... if it concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires"); § 354, "Interest as Damages" ("interest may be allowed as justice requires"); § 358, "Form of Order and Other
Relief' ("order of specific performance ... on such terms as justice requires"); § 371, "Measure of
Restitution Interest" (measurement of restitution interest "as justice requires"); § 384, "Requirement
That Party Seeking Restitution Return Benefit" (compensation in place of return of property in restitution "if justice requires that compensation be accepted") (emphases added throughout).
286. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS (1981). For example,§ 348, "Alternatives to
Loss in Value of Performance," (when cost of breach is not adequately proved party may recover cost
of completing performance or remedying defects "if that cost is not clearly disproportionate to the
probable loss"); § 229, "Excuse of a Condition to Avoid Forfeiture" (court may excuse the nonoccurrence of a condition "to the extent [it) ... would cause disproportionate forfeiture"); § 237, " Effect on
Other Party's Duties of a Failure To Render Performance" ("condition of each party's remaining duties [is] . . . that there be no uncured material failure by the other party");§ 241, "Circumstances Significant in Determining Whether a Failure Is Material" (listed circumstances advise on " whether a
failure to render or to offer performance is material")(emphases added throughout).
287. As Professor Greenawalt has noted, "(s)trict deontological and strict consequentialist approaches may have a kind of theoretical purity that is lacking in a mixed account; but it would be mistaken to dismiss the latter as incoherent." R. Kent Greenawalt, Violence- Legal Justification and
Moral Appraisal, 32 EMORY L.J. 437,456 (1983).
For example, the tort-based statute applied in Peevyhouse contained a consequentialist element"no person can recover a greater amount in damages for the breach of an obligation than he would
have gained by the full performance thereof"-as well as a deontological element-"where an obligation of any kind appears to create a right to unconscionable and grossly oppressive damages, contrary
to substantial justice no more than reasonable damages can be recovered." Peevyhouse v. Garland
Coal & Min. Co., 382 P.2d 109, 113 (Okla. 1963) (quoting an Oklahoma statute). Under the Peevyhause court's application of this statute, the remedy sought by the plaintiffs was "unconscionable and
grossly oppressive damages, contrary to substantial justice . . . . Also, it can hardly be denied that if
plaintiffs here are permitted to recover under the 'cost of performance' rule, they will receive a greater
benefit from the breach than could be gained from full performance." /d. (quotation omitted).
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reach the same or very similar conclusions, 288 it is not always clear which
perspective informs a particular result. 289 Only when the doctrine is construed in terms of concrete context can we begin to decide which normative theory is determinative or, even, plausible.
The foregoing should not be taken as nihilism. Contract is not immoral or even amoral. It is probably better to conclude that Contract is
"omni-moral," to coin a term. Contract adjusts to the normative light
that surrounds the context, and is in that way normatively "chameleonic." Does that mean that Contract is no more "than the largely random result of historical and political accidents"? 290 Well, yes, in a way
you could say that. But the same might be said of us all, and of all things
normative.
CONCLUSION

Abundant intellectual and scholarly energy has been expended in
the effort to "discover" a theory of Contract. I do not conclude that that
energy has been wasted; I do conclude that it has generated more heat
than light. This piece has surveyed, summarily, the Contract theory terrain and has found sufficient irregularities to frustrate the smooth navigation of any of the alternatives. Contract just will not stay in the boxes we
would have cabin it, and that is true no matter how we try to combine the
boxes.
From those premises it becomes clear that more important than further pursuit of foredoomed efforts to vindicate the moral integrity (or
even coherence) of Contract is sustained attention to the reasons why
Contract resists the neat imposition of a normative template. This article
has endeavored to begin that more important discussion in earnest. If
the preliminary observations and conclusions offered here gain any traction it would have to be because they provide us the means to recalibrate
our conception of the possible, to look in the right places for what we can
find rather than continuing the search where the light may seem better,
but where the answer cannot be found.
Contract is an amalgam; it defies simple reduction, heuristic reduction, into accessible theoretical terms. The reason for that is largely because of the nature of Contract doctrine and because theoretical analysis
cannot yield the results we would have it yield. The deck is stacked
against the endeavor. But there is nothing about that conclusion that is
nihilistic: Contract has a rich texture, too rich a texture to reduce as ex-
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tant theories would have it reduce. We should start over, and should
proceed with the caveat offered by this article firmly in mind.

